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PATIENTS v. PATENTS?: POLICY




Ancient Greek philosophers, such as those depicted in Aris-
totle's The Politics, advocated recognition, awards, and honors
for the achievements of discoverers. At the same time, the Hip-
pocratic Oath commands physicians to care for their patients
ethically and selflessly.2 These Hellenic ideas flourished and
were widely embraced by civilizations around the globe and
throughout the ages.' Yet recently, the western legal system has
witnessed a collision between these ancient principles.
Patents for industrial and consumer innovation are common
and are welcomed in our society.4 Yet the widespread pursuit of
patents for medical innovations has aroused strong opinions and
has elicited powerful emotional reactions from the public, as if a
reminder of one's own mortality Whether a society should rec-
* J.D. 1994, Temple University; B.S. 1990, University of Pennsylvania. The
author serves as a federal legislative attorney in Washington, D.C. Special thanks
go to Temple University Law Professor Michael Libonati for his valuable insights on
legislation, patents and Hellenism. All views and opinions expressed within this ar-
ticle should be exclusively attributed to the author.
' See ARISTOTLE, THE POLrrICS 20-51 (Stephen Everson ed. & Benjamin Jowett
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (critiquing various property law philosophies,
including those related to discovery); see also 1 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW
FUNDA1ENTALS § 1.09, at 1-45 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that Hippodamus and Miletus
advocated honoring of discoveries).
2 HIPPOCRATIC OATH, reprinted in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 138 (T.
Beauchamp & L. Walters eds., 1978).
3 See 1 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 1.09 (discussing extent of recognition of dis-
coverers' achievements by Eastern and Western civilizations); see also F.D. Prager,
The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 106,
111-17 (1952) (reciting historical underpinnings of intellectual property).
4 1 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at vii ("From the very beginning, invention has
been an integral part of the American scene.").
' Some public reaction is due to "speculative fears without considering the social
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ognize, or, further, even protect a medical discovery implicates a
host of questions from the fields of science, law, economics, and
ethics.6 This issue also implicates the proper roles of the federal
government, the states, and the medical and legal professions in
fostering the progress of science, medicine, and the public
health.7
The United States Congress is vested with broad authority
to enact statutes and to shape public policy. The historic 104th
Congress tackled a long legislative agenda, including passing
significant legislation to ensure patient access to health care, as
part of the ongoing debate over a national health care policy.8
Numerous intellectual property bills were also introduced to ad-
dress the interests of patent, copyright, and trademark holders.
Legal worlds collided when a conflict arose between health
care and patent law. Litigation over patents for medical proce-
dures became a subject of political debate. In response, a re-
striction on medical procedure patent infringement remedies was
introduced in the Congress and signed into law by the President.
The outcome of this legislative activity reveals much about the
perceptions of the medical and patent law professions, as well as
the fundamental underpinnings of the United States patent sys-
tem.
This Article explores whether the patent code can be
changed in a way that enhances innovation and economic activ-
ity, especially in the biomedical arena. Consideration is given to
aspects of the legal, economic, scientific, and ethical dimensions
of the intersection of medicine and patent law. In light of recent
and medical benefits that innovation stimulated by the patent system could pro-
vide." Robertson, Letter, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1985, at 48.
6 See generally Gregory F. Burch, Note, Ethical Considerations in the Patenting
of Medical Processes, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1139 (1987) (discussing law and policy sup-
porting patents and ethical objections raised in context of medical innovation).
" The Constitution grants Congress the power "[to promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8; see also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) ('[Tihe pro-
motion of the progress of science and the useful arts is the 'main object' [of patents];
reward of inventors is secondary and merely a means to that end."). Congress must
weigh numerous considerations in its creation of the rules governing the patent sys-
tem, such as the social and economic cost of suppressing free market competition
and permitting monopoly. See 1 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-7 to 1-20.2
(discussing concept of monopoly and its effects).
' Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (amending Internal Revenue code of 1986 to better port-
ability and continuity of health insurance coverage).
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litigation and legislation, this Article reviews the background
and history of medical patents and discusses alternatives to the
newly enacted change in the patent code. The next section of
this Article advocates prior user rights as a narrowly tailored al-
ternative course to solve some of the patent system's current
flaws, both with biotechnology and generally. Finally, this Arti-
cle examines these policies in the context of economic theory and
legal principles.
I. MEDICAL PATENT LEGISLATION
"The reason for the patent system is to encourage innovation
and its fruits: new jobs and new industries, new consumer goods
and trade benefits."9
Recent medical patent litigation spurred a legislative chain
reaction. In Pallin v. Singer,"0 eye surgeon Dr. Samuel Pallin
sued several of his peers, including fellow eye surgeon, Dr. Jack
Singer, for the infringement of a medical procedure patent cover-
ing a new cataract surgery technique.1 Neither civil suits
against doctors nor patent infringement litigation are uncommon
on their own merits,' yet this suit is considered remarkable. It
is a rare instance of one physician suing another over an inven-
tion such as a medical procedure patent.
13
The invention at stake is patent number 5,080,111, a tech-
nique for making a chevron shaped incision into the white wall of
the eye'4 in such a fashion to be "substantially self sealing" and
sutureless.5 The Pallin patent reportedly results in a "savings of
9 Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
10 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050 (1995).
" Id. at 1051-52.
'"The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") estimates that dur-
ing Fiscal Year 1995, there were 1081 patent infringement suits in the federal dis-
trict courts. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, SETTING THE COURSE FOR OUR
FuTuRE, A PATENT AND TRADEMARK REVIEW 109 (1996).
"See Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act: Hearings on H.R.
1127 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Michael K Kirk, Executive Di-
rector, American Intellectual Property Law Association), 1995 WL 615737, at *2
(discussing patents for medical treatment and procedure inventions) [hereinafter
Medical Hearings].
14 See Hearings on H.R. 1127 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, at 3 (Oct. 19, 1995) (testimony of Dr.
Jack A. Singer) (discussing patent No. 5,080,111) [hereinafter Singer Hearings].
"The abstract of the Pallin patent reads:
A substantially self sealing episcleral incision having an approximate cen-
1997]
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$17 per operation."" Despite these savings, the defendants ob-
jected to paying either the patent royalty fee of $5 per operation 7
or a flat fee for a clinic of $2,500 to $10,000 per year."'
In the district court proceeding, Singer and the other defen-
dants moved for summary judgment, alleging the invalidity of
the patent.9 The district court denied this motion on the
grounds that the defendants failed to demonstrate the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact regarding obviousness of the inno-
vation, one of the key factors of patent validity.0 Ultimately, the
court entered a consent order declaring the four patent claims of
tral point 1.5 to 3.0 millimeters posterior to the limbus. Portion of the inci-
sion extending from the approximate central point extend laterally away
from the curvature of the limbus. The configuration of the self-sealing in-
cision allows the incision to seal as the eye is inflated following surgery and
therefore requires no sutures for sealing. Accordingly, the probability of
astigmatism is eliminated or greatly reduced and the reliance on sutures is
eliminated.
U.S. Patent No. 5,080,111 (issued Jan. 14, 1992).
'6 See Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act: Hearings on H.R.
1127 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, at 4 (testimony of Dr. Samuel Lear Pallin) [hereinafter Pallin
Hearings].
'7 See Hearings on H.R. 1127 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, at 7 (Oct. 19, 1995) (testimony of
Donald R. Dunner, Chair, Section of Intellectual Property Law, American Bar As-
sociation) [hereinafter Dunner Hearings].
18 See Hearings on H.R. 1127 and H.R. 2419 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, at 4 (Oct. 19, 1995)
(testimony of Dr. Charles D. Kelman, President, American Society of Cataract and
Refractive Surgery) (discussing royalty fees under Pallin patent) [hereinafter Kel-
man Hearings]
'9 Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050, 1051 (1995). Defendants sought
summary judgment based upon the assertion that plaintiffs claims of invention
were barred under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g) & 103. Id. Defendants argued that since
other doctors utilized the technique prior to the date plaintiff first used the proce-
dure, plaintiff was precluded from receiving a valid patent. Id.
20 Id. at 1053-54. "Nonobviousness" is a key statutory requirement for a patent.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). Section 103 of the United States Code provides a subjective
test that considers numerous factors for determining nonobviousness. See RONALD
B. HILDRETH, PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GuIDE 91 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing
nonobviousness factors). "[S]ection 103 requires a Court to: (1) determine the scope
and prior content of the prior art; (2) ascertain the differences between the prior art
and the claims at issue; and (3) resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art." Pallin, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1053 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17
(1996) and Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). In
addition, 'secondary considerations [such] as commercial success, long felt but un-
solved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circum-
stances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented." Gra-
ham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
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the Pallin patent in controversy to be invalid, and Dr. Pallin
agreed not to enforce the remaining patent claims.21
During this litigation, the American Medical Association
House of Delegates voted to condemn the patenting of medical
and surgical procedures.' The Delegates further agreed to "work
with Congress to outlaw this practice."' True to their pledge,
this very subject was raised before the 104th Congress, which
held seven physicians among its ranks.
In the House of Representatives, physician and Congress-
man Greg Ganske (R-IA) introduced "The Medical Procedures
Innovation and Affordability Act of 1995," H.R. 1127,24 which
would create a moratorium on patents for medical procedures
and therapies.' In the United States Senate, Senator Bill Frist
(R-TN), a heart surgeon, introduced a similar bill, the "Medical
Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act," S. 1334.26 This
measure would allow medical procedure patents to still be is-
sued, but it would preclude an inventor from enforcing the pat-
ent or obtaining remedies against patent infringement by medi-
cal practitioners.27
21 Pallin v. Singer, No. CIVA.2:93-CV-202, 1996 WL 274407 (D. Vt. Mar. 28,
1996).
22 See William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 651, 651 (1995) (stating that efforts to condemn pat-
enting of medical and surgical treatments was response to Pallin case).
' Id. In addition, the American Academy of Ophthalmology is working with its
lobbyists on Capitol Hill to urge the enactment of legislation exempting such proce-
dures from patent protection. See id. at 652. However, in 1957 the Judicial Counsel
of the American Medical Association issued an official opinion that medical patents
were not necessarily unethical. See id. at 655.
H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995).
' The Amendment "would bar the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office from
granting patents on surgical procedures and other medical techniques unrelated to
patented drugs or devices." Noonan, supra note 22, at 652 n.7; see H.R. 1127, 104th
Cong. (1995). It would exempt from this bar only those methods or processes which
are erformed by a machine which is itself separately patentable. Id..
S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995). The measure proposed amending 35 U.S.C. § 271
by adding the following subsection:
(j) (1) For any patent issued on or after the effective date of this subsection,
it shall not be an act of infringement for a patient, physician, or other li-
censed health care practitioner, or a health care entity with which a phy-
sician or licensed health care practitioner is professionally affiliated, to use
or induce others to use a patented technique, method, or process for per-
forming a surgical or medical procedure, administering a surgical or medi-
cal therapy, or making a medical diagnosis.
Id.
See id. (denying enforcement of patent infringement claim). This is not the
1997]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Recent history clearly demonstrates that present congres-
sional leaders are well versed in intellectual property law and
have fought fiercely for its protection.28 Yet a moratorium on any
type of patentable subject matter or corresponding remedy is a
radical departure in intellectual property law. After the intro-
duction of H.R. 1127 and S. 1334, there was an active and suc-
cessful effort by these young revolutionaries to gain congres-
sional support for these bills. Consider as evidence of their
success that 128 Members of the House of Representatives
signed on as cosponsors of H.R. 1127.29
As part of the authorization process, the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property held hearings
on the merits of the measure." The United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) also scheduled hearings.31 The United
States Senate never held hearings, and there was no further ac-
tion to advance either bill through the committee authorization
process.
Nevertheless, the campaign by the medical community and
legislators to advance the bills continued. The patenting of all
procedures and processes was scorned as a new and unwise de-
velopment. The attempt to patent medical procedures was lik-
ened to trying to patent "Ted William's baseball swing or Mi-
chael Jordan's jump shot."2 Then, Representative Ganske
first time that Congress considered such an intellectual property policy initiative. In
1902, legislation to ban medical patents altogether was considered by the 57th Con-
gress. See Noonan, supra note 22, at 654 & n.16 (discussing law concerning patent-
ing methods of medical treatment at turn of century). Although the bill was re-
ported by the House Committee on Patents, it did not receive additional
consideration. See id. Similar legislation was introduced in the 58th Congress, but
that effort was also unsuccessful. Id.
See Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late than Never: Implementation of the 1886 Berne
Convention, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171 (1989); Dana Rohrabacher and Paul Crilly,
The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 263, 270-72 (1995)
(arguing that strong patent system is in Nation's best interest, but opposing imple-
menting prior user rights).
See 142 CONG. REC. H8276, H8289 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (listing votes of
members).3' See supra note 13.
31142 CONG. REc. at H8277 (statement of Rep. Moorhead, Chairman, Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property) (noting that PTO held hearings
on H.R. 1127).
32 Kelman Hearings, supra note 18, at 3. Ironically, while Dr. Charles Kelman is
a vocal opponent of medical procedure patents, a search of the U.S. patent database
reveals that he has more than 70 U.S. medical device patents relating to ophthal-
mology, including U.S. Patent No. 4,728,182 "Bi-focal contact lens." See generally
1976-96 on-line patent database, <http'//patents.cndir.org>.
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undertook an alternate route. He offered a modified version of
his bill as a floor amendment to the funding bill that prescribed
the appropriations for the PTO.3 This version of the bill in-
tended to use the House's power of the purse to prevent the PTO
from issuing medical patents.'
As part of the debate on the House floor for the measure, the
sponsor argued the following five reasons in opposition to medi-
cal procedure patents:
No. 1, patient access to new surgical and medical procedures is
being threatened by medical patents;
No. 2, medical patents permit patent owners to charge monopoly
prices and contribute to our Nation's health care costs;
No. 3, physicians have an obligation to share their knowledge
and skills for the benefit of humanity;
No. 4, medical patents are not necessary for the advancement of
medicine. Did Oxner, the Mayo brothers, Lahey, or DeBakey
need patents to advance medical knowledge?
And No. 5, 80 countries around the world, including most of
Europe, expressly prohibit medical patents. The United States
is virtually alone in the world in granting monopoly rights to
these procedures.35
Other members joined in this passionate floor debate. Rep-
resentative Norwood (R-GA), a dentist, stated, "[a]ll of my adult
33Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1997, H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. (1996); see also 142
CONG. REC. at H8276.
34The amendment reads as follows:
Sec. 615. (a) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS TO ISSUE CERTAIN PATENTS.
None of the funds made available in this Act may be used by the Patent
and Trademark Office to issue a patent when it is made known to the Fed-
eral official having authority to obligate or expend such funds that the pat-
ent is for any invention or discovery of a technique, method, or process for
performing a surgical procedure (defined as a treatment for curing or pre-
venting disease, injury, illness, disorder, or deformity by operative meth-
ods, in which human tissue is cut, burned, or vaporized by the use of any
mechanical means, laser, or ionizing radiation, or the penetration of the
skin or body orifice by any means), performing a medical procedure
(defined as a nonsurgical, nondiagnostic procedure for curing or preventing
a disease, injury, illness, disorder, or deformity), or making a medical di-
agnosis (defined as the identification of a medical condition or a disease or
disorder of a body).
Id. The amendment then specifically exempts medical devices and compositions of
matter or biotechnological processes. Id.
142 CONG. REC. at H8277.
1997]
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life I have been taught that as a health care provider, I should be
very willing to share any knowledge I have on behalf of the pa-
tient."36  Representative Tom Coburn (R-OK), an obstetrician,
also argued against medical patents by stating:
I think this debate goes back down to one of the core issues in
our country, whether a physician, no matter what particular
oath they took, whether or not they are going to follow that
oath, nowhere should a medical procedure get in the way of of-
fering care to any other patient. I think most people will agree
with that.
3 7
Opponents"8 fired back by arguing that this issue is extremely
complex and that the appropriations process was not the proper
vehicle to advance this issue.39
Yet, during consideration of the appropriations bill, the
amendment was overwhelmingly adopted by a vote of 295-128 in
the House." Despite this showing of support in the House, this
funding limitation was never the subject of hearings or debate by
the Senate and ultimately did not become law.
Instead, a modified version of S. 13344' was added as a
"rider" to an omnibus appropriations bill and signed into law
during the final days of the 104th Congress." This occurred de-
36 Id. at H8278 (statement of Rep. Norwood).
3' Id. (statement of Rep. Coburn).
Opponents included the Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property Carlos Moorhead (R-CA), Ranking Member Pat Schroeder
(D-CO), and Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Harold Rogers (R-KY). Id. at
H8277-78.
39 See id. at H8277 (remarks of Rep. Rogers) (arguing for authorization process
rather than appropriations process).
40 See 142 CoNG. REc. at H8289-90 (listing votes of members). The measure was
never enacted since the funding measure was defeated in an election year budget
battle between Congress and the White House.
4' The amendment would create the following new section to the Patent Code,
amending 35 U.S.C. § 287:
(c)(1) With respect to a medical practitioner's performance, of a medical
activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271 (a) or (b) of this
title, the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not
apply against the medical practitioner or against a related health care en-
tity with respect to such medical activity.
142 CONG. REc. H11662, H11662 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (italics omitted). How-
ever, the compromise language would not apply to any medical process involving a
compound subject to FDA or regulatory approval. Id. The law would also be pro-
spective, applying only to patents issued after the provision's enactment. Id.
' The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 30009 (1996). The new law reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 287 of title 35, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
[Vol. 71:329
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spite the fierce opposition of Senate leaders, including Senator
Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, and Senator Roth (R-DE), Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee."
This new law presents extremely complex issues regarding
the effects of medical process patents on the nation's public
health care and intellectual property systems. Its analysis re-
quires a quick review of the fundamentals of our constitutionally
rooted system.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & CONGRESS
The Framers included a broad grant in the Constitution to
ensure the "Progress of Science and the useful Arts."' While the
Constitution is silent on any particular method of safeguarding
intellectual property, Congress's authority in this arena flows
from this provision, also known as the Copyright and Patent
clause. In addition, there are other complementary forms of in-
tellectual property involving commerce and trade, some of which
are traditionally rooted in state law. Today, there are four forms
of intellectual property protection in place to safeguard innova-
tive endeavors: patents (e.g., inventions); copyrights (e.g., writ-
ten and recorded works); trademarks (e.g., commercial logos);
and trade secrets (e.g., proprietary information).
A number of policies have evolved to advance the Framers'
goals and constitutional principles. There is a strong federal
policy that discoveries and inventions in "general circulation" be
end the following new subsection:
(c) (1) With respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical
activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271 (a) or (b) of this
title, the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not
apply against the medical practitioner or against a related health care en-
tity with respect to such medical activity.
Id. § 616
142 CONG. REC. S11838, S11842-45 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter written
by Senators Hatch and Roth). "I think there should be a very heavy burden on those
advocating change of a law that appears to be working well and has worked well for
a long time. In my view, this burden has not been met." Id. at 11844 (statement of
Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary). Senator Hatch warns
that this measure, which is also opposed by the General Counsel of the Office of the
United States Trade Representative, has serious consequences on the Patent Code
and our international trade policy. Id. at 11843.
"The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8.
1997]
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dedicated to the common good, unless narrowly restricted by
some intellectual property law protection.45 Again and again, our
legal system stresses the policy of the "full and free" use of all
ideas in the public domain.4"
Judge Pauline Newman of the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit defined "technological innovation" as the process "of
advancing the useful arts."' For her, patents are a vital tool and
part of the constitutionally-based right that "carries the obliga-
tion to disclose the workings of the invention ... [that adds] to
the store of knowledge without diminishing the patent-supported
incentive to innovate."48
Under our federal system, states are preempted from estab-
lishing new monopolistic laws for protecting inventions outside
the patent system.49 Inventions in the public domain are unpat-
entable and may not be protected by a state regime.'o The Su-
preme Court has noted that the Copyright and Patent Clause of
the United States Constitution reflects a fundamental policy to
ensure the national uniformity of intellectual property laws.51
The Copyright and Patent clause is not self-executing. Con-
gress is responsible for creating federal protective devices, such
as enacting intellectual property statutes. Consequently, pat-
ents are entirely a creature of federal statute;52 there is no com-
See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969) (stating that federal law re-
quires that ideas in general circulation be in public domain); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964) (holding that intellectual property
left within public domain by Patent and Copyright laws is not entitled to patent pro-
tection); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964) (holding
that government cannot prevent copying information within pubic domain); Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938) (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. June
Mfg., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)) (noting that when patent expires, right to make ar-
ticle passes to public).
" See Lear, 395 U.S. at 670 (noting that important public interest in allowing
full and free utilization of ideas within that are part of public domain).
47 Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
48 Id. However, under trade secret law, an inventor who keeps his invention se-
cret may enjoy de facto exclusivity and may rely on state enforcement of nondisclo-
sure agreements. 1 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 3.01, at 3-2-3-5.
49 See Lear, 395 U.S. at 677 (Black, J., concurring) (expressing belief that no
state has right to allow monopoly on invention).
' See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989)
(noting that boat hull designs could not be patented where federal patent law pre-
empts state laws).
5' See id. at 162.
52 Property in patents exists solely by virtue of federal statutory law, and inci-
dents of that property are defined and determined by the patent statutes. See
Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40 (1923). The first
[Vol. 71:329
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mon law of patents.53 Likewise, Congress has the power to
change the patent laws at its pleasure.' For this reason, all fed-
eral legislative activity pertaining to patents-including hearings,
floor activity, and the enactment of statutes-is particularly wor-
thy of careful consideration.
III. PATENTS VERSUS TRADE SECRETS
The statutory requirements and conditions for receiving a
patent for an invention are simple. The scope of patentability for
inventions and discoveries under the statute includes "any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement."55 "Invention" and
"process" are defined under the statute.5 The innovation, in
addition, must be useful, novel, and non-obvious to those skilled
in the pertinent technical discipline at the time of the inventive
conception."
Exceptions to the patentable subject matter requirements
are extremely rare. The Supreme Court declared that "anything
under the sun that is made by man"8 is patentable. There is a
public policy against the issuance of patents that are exclusively
devoted to purposes harmful to the public welfare.59 As a result,
there currently exists a sole class of inventions, atomic weapons,
patent statute was enacted in 1790. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109.
63See In re McKellin, 529 F.2d 1324, 1333 (C.C.P-A. 1976) (Markey, C.J., con-
curring) (noting that no common law patent exists).
' See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). This is limited to "man-made" articles, and thus
printed matter, naturally occurring articles, methods of doing business, and scien-
tific principles may not be patented. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (defining conditions for
patentability); see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 706.03(b) (5th
ed. 1993) (noting bar on atomic energy patents).
"The term 'invention! means invention or discovery." 35 U.S.C. § 100(a)
(1994). "The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use of
a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." Id. at
§ 100(b).
57 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
"s Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citations omitted). The
Court reasoned that a broad interpretation of the patent statute was necessary in
light of its "core concept" to protect the unforeseeable fruits of the inventive process.
Id. at 316. The Court stated that "[the Act embodied Jefferson's philosophy that
'ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.' "Id. at 308 (citation omitted).
r9 For example, an invention whose entire purpose is devoted to lock-picking,
and lacks any other useful and socially redeeming characteristics, is said to be ex-
cluded.
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that has earned a statutory prohibition."
The bundle of patent rights that a successful inventor en-
joys, the exclusive rights to make, use, and sell, only vest upon
the issue of a federal patent. The rights of an inventor against
infringement are provided by statute."' During the pendency,
the time between the patent application and the PTO's final de-
cision of its patentability, an inventor must take special precau-
tions against infringers. During the pendency period, a patent
application is held in secret and enjoys confidential, non-public
status at the PTO. 2 Upon the grant of a patent, the technical in-
formation about an invention is published. In this way, the pub-
lic's knowledge is enriched as interested parties can learn about
the invention. Courts acknowledge that there is a quid pro quo.
Namely, the disclosure of knowledge in return for a patent mo-
nopoly is the benefit of the bargain underlying the societal prog-
ress that the patent system promises."
In its goal to promote scientific progress, the patent system
advances several federal policy objectives that comport with sci-
entific and economic theories. The "storehouse theory" is one
such relevant legal property theory. It states that disclosure un-
der the patent system "enlarges the public storehouse of knowl-
edge."" The patent system grants a limited monopoly to the
applicant who first contributes "a measure of worthwhile knowl-
edge to the public storehouse."65
All medical patent moratorium legislation is criticized for
frustrating important federal policy objectives, such as public
' See The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 151(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (1994). Crit-
ics argue that the true rationale for this legislation was for the government to de-
velop a monopoly in the atomic energy field. Burch, supra note 6, at 1164.
6' 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994) (defining liability for infringement of patents).
62Id. § 122.
' See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933)
(distinguishing monopolies from patents and noting quid pro quo of patent system);
United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 239 (1897) (supporting asser-
tion that inventions ultimately add to sum of human knowledge, therefore, patent
protection is justified); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 247 (1832) (noting
that patent system design allows public to benefit from invention while compensat-
ing inventor with temporary monopoly).
" Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1017, 1024 (1989).
' In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concur-
ring). Thus, a patent is to be distinguished from a monopoly-which connotes the
usurpation by one entity of the right to use something the public once freely en-
joyed. See Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 186.
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disclosure of invention technology. Opponents argue that deny-
ing full patent protection for medical innovation artificially
blocks the efficient dissemination of knowledge, since informa-
tion on new procedures revealed through patent publication falls
outside the traditional forum of medical journals.66 Similarly,
the practice of prohibiting medical patents serves to deter phy-
sicians and researchers from making disclosures.67 Clearly, ren-
dering a class of patents virtually unenforceable due to the lack
of adequate remedy leads to researchers securing fewer of these
patents. In turn, the current statutory framework chills inven-
tion and frustrates the important federal objectives behind pat-
ents.
Two economic-oriented patent theories concerning the pro-
motion of a favorable economic climate for inventive activity are
the "prospect theory" and the "innovative theory." The "prospect
theory" states that the opportunity to obtain a patent monopoly
creates the incentive for investment in research for new inven-
tions." The "innovation theory" asserts that patents are neces-
sary to induce firms to put existing inventions to practical use.69
This theory rests upon the belief that even though the invention
requires an investment, considerable subsequent investment
must be made before its commercial exploitation is possible.
Thus, regardless of the term of patent protection, the necessary
costs of promoting, manufacturing, and refining may dwarf the
required initial research investment that created the invention. °
66 Pallin Hearings, supra note 16, at 2.
67 Id. at 5.
63 See Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1024. Professor Eisenberg notes that many
find the idea of granting exclusive rights in new knowledge to be counterintuitive to
the goal of scientific progress. Id. at 1017. She also asserts that divergent views on
how to promote scientific progress may conflict when subsequent researchers use
patented inventions in their studies. Id.
r9 Id. at 1036-37. Professor Eisenberg suggests that while courts have primarily
used the incentive theory to advance arguments in favor of the patent system, no-
table exceptions appear in Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632 (2d Cir.
1942), and SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 n.9 (2d Cir. 1981), where
the courts strayed from the beaten path, advocating that stimulus to investment
rather than innovation may be the central theme in the justification of the patent
system. Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1037 n.81. Like the "prospect theory," the
"innovation theory" posits that the patent system best achieves its aims by offering
monopoly profits "as a lure to promote desired behavior." Id. at 1037.
70 Id. Patent protection, therefore, is needed to enhance the likelihood that a
firm will be willing to undertake these substantial investments. Id.; see also
FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES
3-7 (1984) (describing phases of investment in development of inventions).
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The term of a patent begins with the grant by the PTO and
extends a maximum of twenty years after its initial filing.7 ' This
rule regarding term, however, is not absolute. Patents may be
extended by a special act of Congress or under another promul-
gated statutory regime, such as the procedures designed to com-
pensate patentees for time loss during FDA review of pharma-
72ceutical or medical devices.
In accord with federal objectives, there is also a strong policy
mandating that patents which were improperly awarded should
neither unduly fetter technology nor restrict competition. There
are statutory bases to challenge the underlying validity of a pat-
ent, such as reexamination. 73 A separate statutory proceeding,
called an interference, is used in challenges over the priority of
the true inventorship.74
According to empirical studies, an overwhelming majority of
patents are put to use before a patent's issuance.75 Since the
United States patent system awards no protection for an inven-
tion before the grant of a patent, the inventor often relies on
some form of secrecy during the beginning stages of develop-
ment.
The very name "patent" is derived from the Latin patere,
which means "open."76 In contrast, the cornerstone of trade se-
7' 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). This is a departure from the traditional 17 year
term which was the rule for many years in the United States. However, a patent
will have a term of at least 17 years if its processing by the PTO takes three or
fewer years. The change was prompted by the United States' implementation of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT'). See Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
72 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)
(1994).
73 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1994) ("Any person at any time may file a request for reex-
amination by the [Patent and Trademark] Office.").
'4 Id. § 135. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences determines ques-
tions of priority of inventions. Id.
"' A study of a random sample of patents issued in 1938, 1948, and 1952, which
were commercially exploited found that 40 percent are put to use before the filing of
a patent application; approximately 50 percent are put to use during patent appli-
cation pendency; and only 10 percent are first put to use after patent issuance.
Barkev S. Sanders, Some Difficulties in Measuring Inventive Activity, in THE RATE
AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS, at 56, tbL
1 (1962).
76 In practice, a patent application made available to the public may not be very
"open." As Judge Pauline Newman noted, "[ilt is a rare invention that cannot be de-
ciphered more readily from its commercial embodiment than from the printed pat-
ent." Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Interestingly, the
court explained that it did not believe "that the public interest is served by placing
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crets is secrecy.77 In practice, a common strategy for inventors is
to use some combination of patents and trade secrets.
The Supreme Court has held that the federal intellectual
property system, patents and copyrights, does not preempt, but
in fact works in tandem with other forms of intellectual property
protection (e.g., state trade secrecy law).' Accordingly, state
laws are often complementary methods for protecting intellec-
tual property.79
There is a positive public effect where dual systems of pro-
tection operate in concert.8° State trade secret law harmoniously
coexists with the federal patent system, providing the mecha-
nism to achieve and maintain the necessary economic incentives
to encourage invention.8 Trade secrets are different devices
... [a] severe ... sanction on failure to file premature patent applications on imma-
tare inventions of unknown value." See id.
CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 850 (1st Cir. 1985) (afrming trial
court's finding that fraudulently asserting trade secret rights violated federal anti-
trust laws).
Trade secrets are creatures of state law and every state has some scheme to
provide protection; there is no federal trade secret law. A trade secret may consist of
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which provides an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competi-
tors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a
process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine
or other device, or a list of customers. See A-L.I. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, §
757 cmt. b (1939).
78 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 556-58 (1973). "(We cannot discern
such an unyielding national interest as to require an inference that state power to
grant copyrights has been relinquished to exclusive federal control." Id. at 558. Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that no conflict existed between state and federal copy-
right law. Id. at 570.79 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-82 (1974). The Court
noted that the patent statutes "dol not explicitly endorse or forbid the operation of
trade secret law." Id. at 480. The Court also stated that patents and trade secrets
each have a "particular role to play, and the operation of one does not take away
from the need for the other." Id. at 493.
Eo "Trade secret law will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not
reach, and will prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and
exploitation of his invention. Competition is fostered and the public is not deprived
of the use of valuable, if not quite patentable, invention." Id. at 485. The court rec-
ognized that both systems are designed to encourage invention, and in that respect
they will complement each other. See id. at 484.
81 Gordon L. Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Pat-
ent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1454 (1967) (stating that pat-
ent and trade secret systems have similar policy goals); see also Kewanee Oil, 416
U.S. at 484-85 (asserting that state and federal systems are unlikely to conflict with
each other because both have similar policy goals).
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which encourage innovation,82 maintain business ethics, promote
fair dealing,83 foster sharing of knowledge, and promote efficient
commercialization." The most valuable aspect of trade secrets is
neither the power to exclude competitors nor the certainty as to
the duration of protection but rather, the head start to commer-
cialization. This differs from the benefits flowing from patents,
which include the power to exclude competitors, and the cer-
tainty of the duration of such protection.85
In deciding which form of protection to pursue, there-are a
number of strategic and personal questions the trade secret
holder must consider. First, one must decide whether patent
protection is warranted at all. This decision hinges on several
questions, including: (1) whether the invention meets the re-
quirements for a patent; (2) whether the patent system provides
an adequate term of protection; (3) whether the inevitable public
disclosure is counter to the concerns of the firm; and (4) the ex-
pense of enforcing a patent. Additionally, cynicism deters some
from participating in the patent system altogether.8
In foregoing the patent route, an inventor must assess
whether the trade secret can be kept adequately confidential.87 A
trade secret holder must also take steps to police the invention's
secrecy. In order to be protected by law, it is necessary to take
reasonable, but not heroic, precautions to protect the invention.'
There are no legal limits on the duration of a trade secret.
"2 Id. at 481; see also CVD, Inc., 769 F.2d at 850 (stating that purpose of trade
secret law is to encourage innovation).
See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481; see also CVD, Inc., 769 F.2d at 850 (noting
fair dealing promotion in trade secret protection).
' See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 493; see also Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1037
(discussing commercialization of products).
'5 Doerfer, supra note 81, at 1448 (discussing distinctions between trade secret
protection benefits and patent protection benefits).
" See EDWIN MANSFIELD, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 209
(1968); see also A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the
Twenty-First Century, 38 Am. U. L. Rev. 1097, 1101 (1989) (positing that justifica-
tion for patent protection in any country can be determined only after considering
ratio of patent-induced inventions to non-patent-induced inventions).
8' Critics of the patent system argue that firms patent only when they cannot
keep an invention secret. See MANSFIELD, supra note 84; E. PENROSA, THE
ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 12-17 (1973) (noting that be-
cause of costs inherent in patent system, patents are used only when secrecy is lost).
CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 851-52 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that
reasonable precautions are mandated); see also USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener
Corp., 393 N.E.2d 895, 896 (Mass. 1979) (analyzing whether plaintiff pursued course
of conduct reasonably designed to preserve secrecy).
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In fact, the medical profession is quick to point out that the
Chamberlain family kept surgical forceps secret for four genera-
tions." In theory, trade secret protection can last forever, or at
least longer than the practical useful life of an invention. The
public perception may be that trade secret protection is long-
lived. Yet, despite the famously secret recipe for Coca-Cola,'
experts confess that the duration of such protection is really not
very long-lived at all.9"
Trade secret protection is considered far weaker than patent
protection due to its indefinite term and limited ability to ex-
clude others from the invention. An independent inventor using
independent creation or reverse engineering who discovers a
trade secret faces few obstacles in commercializing an invention
on her own.91
Trade secret protection works best for inventions and pro-
prietary data that are beyond public scrutiny (e.g., a manufactur-
ing process or the ones and zeroes of a software program code).
A patent, on the other hand, works best to protect a product that
is easily analyzed, like a ceramic coffee mug. The process used
at the factory behind the scenes to glaze the mug, by contrast,
could sufficiently be guarded as a trade secret. There are other
considerations, of course, including whether a technology is in-
tended to be shown to other parties, assigned or licensed. The
inventor, relying solely on trade secret protection, should be
aware that in many cases she has no rights to exclude an inde-
pendent rival inventor from making, selling, or using a similar
invention and may face difficulty in securing licensing protec-
tion.
In light of the Framer's intent to foster broad policy objec-
tives to advance the sciences, the Supreme Court has concluded
that trade secrets are merely a complementary form of intellec-
tual property protection.92 This conclusion does not put society
'9 Medical Hearings, supra note 13, at 1995 WL 615761, at *2 (testimony of Dr.
Samuel Lear Pallin).
90 See Doerfer, supra note 81, at 1448. The patent system is better designed to
protect major product inventions, rather than minor product inventions or process
inventions "which can often be kept secret for considerable lengths of time."
MANSFIELD, supra note 86, at 209.
" See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974) (noting that
trade secret law does not forbid discovery of secret by independent creation of re-
verse engineering).
9See id. at 480 (recognizing settled federal preemption doctrine which states
that when trade secret law clashes with objectives of federal patent law then "the
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at risk since an inventor rarely chooses trade secrets over patent
protection. Ultimately, despite their modest role in protecting
some inventions, most trade secrets fade away because of inde-
pendent discovery, difficulty in maintenance, abandonment due
to obsolescence or unimportance, or an eventual yielding to the
patent system.
True to the Framers' vision, the current legal system em-
braces both patent and trade secrets. Despite the overall com-
plexity and vast history of this area, our intellectual property
law system's traditional policy objectives have remained con-
stant. These objectives include stimulating innovation, facilitat-
ing public disclosure, promoting free competition, and maintain-
ing uniformity.93 This Article asserts that certainty is another
extremely important policy objective. In light of the long shared
history and goals of medicine and patents, Congress must be
mindful to promote certainty in addition to the aforementioned
federal policy objectives as it refines intellectual property law.
IV. THE HISTORICAL UNION OF MEDICINE AND PATENTS
"No one has advanced a just and logical reason why reward
for service to the public should be extended to the inventor of a
mechanical toy and denied to the genius whose patience, fore-
sight, and effort have given a valuable new [discovery] to man-
kind. "4
Patents were not always available as a means of protecting
medical innovation. Some of the earliest trade secret cases on
record involved the tort of misappropriation concerning formulas
for varieties of "patent medicine."95 In Green v. Folgham,96 the
trade secret was the formula for "Dr. Johnson's Ointment for the
state law must fall"); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1973) (holding
that state trade secret protection law aligned with patent system goals are not pre-
empted by federal patent law).
Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of Inventions Meeting Judicial
Standards of Patentability, 87 HARV. L. REV. 807, 819 (1974) (noting history of intel-
lectual property law and positing that policy objectives have remained constant).
9 H.R. REP. No. 71-1129, at 2 (1930).
9 There is some confusion in the terminology since the courts have permitted
the term "patent medicine" to be used for those peccaries and concoctions which are
proprietary in nature, but are not in fact deserving of patent protection. See Jacobs
v. Beecham, 221 U.S. 263, 273 (1911) (recognizing widespread use of word "patent"
to indicate medicines made by secret formulas).
1 Sim. & St. 398, 57 Eng. Rep. 159, 159 (Ch. 1823).
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Eyes."97 As the nature of manufacturing and treatment admini-
stration evolved, patents became the superior means to protect
new medical discoveries. This protection eventually became
possible because medical inventions were allowed within the
broadly construed scope of patentable subject matter.
Traditionally, the patent statute was silent on medical pat-
ents per se. This is one reason why the newly enacted change in
section 287 is historic." Opponents of medical process patents
believe this type of patent is a troubling newcomer to the health
care scene and that the PTO should not use its funding to issue
this "new" type of patent. However, in fact, scores of United
States patents on medical and surgical procedures have been is-
sued over the past nearly one-hundred and fifty years.99 There-
fore, it is inaccurate to describe medical patents as a "new phe-
nomenon.'10 The frequency of medical patents is already so high
that they are even described as being in "common currency."1 '
Medical process patents have ranged from the use of ether in
surgery as an anesthesia"° to new developments in genetic re-
search.
10 3
One of the principal arguments against medical procedure
patents is that they are unnecessary to stimulate scientific medi-
cal discovery. Yet, history is filled with numerous examples of
patented medical compounds whose prominence fueled research
efforts.'" These gained prominence due to their economic value
and societal benefit. Even within the medical community there
is general agreement that drugs and medical devices merit pat-
ent protection, due to the need to recoup the great investment in
E17 Id. The ointment ingredients were wrongfully disclosed by its holder in trust.
Id. Although the plaintiff sought a sale of the secret, the court ordered an account-
ing for profits by its commercial user. Id. For further history tracing the develop-
ment of the legal concept of trade secret protection in English common law, see 1
MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 2.01, 2-3 (1996).
93 See supra note 42 (listing changes to section 287).
Noonan, supra note 22, at 658-60 (noting long history of medical process pat-
ents).
100 Id. at 652 (citing AMA Opposes Patents for Medical, Surgical Procedures,
AMA NEWS, July 4, 1994, at 6).
'0' Noonan, supra note 22, at 652.
02 U.S. Patent No. 4848 (issue date 1846).
103 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (determining that
patent protection could extend to artificial organisms produced by genetic engineer-
ing).I
104 Noonan, supra note 22, at 659 (listing prominent patented medical com-
pounds).
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research, development, and governmental regulatory approval.' 5
At the turn of the century, one of the most important com-
mon cures arose from the industrial chemical industry. The
United States Patent Code, unlike the laws of other nations at
the time, provided industrial chemical firms protection for both
their products and processes.' Author Jan McTavish concludes
that it is unlikely that medical uses for acetylsalicylic acid
(aspirin) would ever have been discovered were it not for the re-
search laboratory established to exploit the relationship between
industrial chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 7 The German Bayer
company was hence able to enjoy a complete 17-year monopoly in
the United States through patent protection (1900-1917).118 The
Bayer company thereafter enjoyed limited success maintaining
its aspirin product protection through another form of intellec-
tual property, vigorous trademark enforcement. 9  Today,
"aspirin" is a household word on every continent."0
There is dramatic historical evidence correlating the patent-
ing of a medical breakthrough and the cure's prominence."' The
discovery of anesthesia, for example, resulted in one of history's
greatest and earliest medical patent controversies. Until the
middle of the Nineteenth Century, people suffering dental prob-
lems avoided visiting a dentist because of the fear of pain. Then
in 1844, Connecticut dentist Horace Wells discovered anesthesia,
which (somewhat) changed the way many felt about seeking out
care from dentists."'
105 Id. at 656.
106 Jan R. McTavish, What's in a Name? Aspirin and the American Medical As-
sociation, 61 BULL. HIST. MED. 343, 347 (1987).
107 Id. at 363.
"o Id. at 346.
o' Id. at 363. While United States' courts severely limited the scope of the
trademark protection for the term "aspirin," Canadian courts provided far greater
rights to Sterling, the company which succeeded Bayer as the holder of rights in the
period after World War II. Id. at 362 n.56.
"0 McTavish, supra note 106, at 346.
"'. In contrast, experts assert that the lack of patent litigation in areas where
the medical profession has never sought to enforce its medical procedure patents, a
multi-million dollar technology, like Surrogate Embryo Transfer (SET), is the real
indicator of a patent's value or lack thereof. See Medical Procedures Innovation and
Affordability Act: Hearings on H.R. 1127 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intel-
lectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, at 14 (1995) (testimony of Dr.
William D. Noonan) (noting that patents are "unimportant to medical progress")
[hereinafter Noonan Hearings].
2 Malvin E. Ring, The Rubber Denture Murder Case: The True Story of the Vul-
canite Litigations, 32 BULL. OF THE HIST. OF DENTISTRY 1, 3-4 (1984).
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There was another related medical breakthrough in den-
tistry in 1844. Charles Goodyear received a patent for his dis-
covery of vulcanized rubber. One way this technology was put to
use was as a denture material. The Goodyear Company recog-
nized the possible commercial applications of this promising
technology and devised a system to extract patent royalties from
the dental profession.' This led to considerable opposition by
the dental profession and a series of infringement lawsuits. One
highly frustrated dentist, Dr. Samuel P. Chalfant, went so far as
to repeatedly move his practice across the country to avoid pay-
ing a licensing fee for the rubber denture patent."' Ultimately,
Dr. Chalfant pursued Goodyear's chief licensing agent to a hotel
in San Francisco and shot him dead."5 This ordeal tempered the
dental professional's resolve never to be the subject of
"profiteering" patent licensing again."6
The rise of medical drug, device, and process patents was
possible, in part, because of the construction of the patent laws.
The judiciary possesses the power to review the validity of medi-
cal process patents and to construe the patent code."7 The de-
velopment of the case law was initially fraught with inconsis-
tency. Modern courts, however, looked to the legislative intent
underlying the enactment of patent laws as a guide to ascertain-
ing whether patent protection was merited, ethically just, and in
furtherance of the public good."' These courts properly inter-
preted the patent laws by balancing the interests between inven-
tors and society and invalidating patents on those medical pro-
cedures which failed to satisfy the requirements for patent
3Id. at5.
14 Id. at 15.
"s Id. at 16.
116 Id. at 17; see also Noonan, supra note 22, at 652-53 (discussing Goodyear's
patent on vulcanizing rubber, subsequent infringement lawsuits against dentists,
and frustrated dentist's murder of Goodyear's licensing agent).
17 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1994) ("An applicant dissatisfied with the decision of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ... may ... have remedy by civil action
against the Commissioner in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia."); see also Lee Pharms. v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1978)
(stating that rejection of patent application by Board of Patent Appeals may be
brought for judicial review).
11 See Burch, supra note 6, at 1149-51 (recognizing that Congress ultimately
determines whether patent serves public good and until Congress passes legislation
prohibiting patents for medical technology, courts are likely to apply "mechanical
analysis" and grant patentability).
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protection.11 9
Over the years, the issue concerning patentability of medical
devices and processes has been confused by both federal courts
and the PTO administrative boards. A basic doctrine of patent
law is that "qualities of nature" may not be patented. 0 This is-
sue was considered in Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary,2'
where the court denied the patentability of ether as a general
anesthetic due to a finding that such use lacked novelty.2 Sub-
sequent cases, such as Ex parte Brinkerhoff,' construed Morton
to stand for the proposition that medical processes could not be
patented whatsoever.' 4  This decision was subsequently over-
ruled by the PTO Board of Patent Appeals in Ex parte Scherer
which upheld the patentability of medical or surgical methods.'
Martin v. Wyeth 26 represents the modern judicial tendency
to uphold the validity of medical patents. In Martin, while not-
ing that the statute does not expressly mention medical process
patents, the court held that medical process patents fall within
the law's patentable subject matter. 7 The court, however, ob-
"9 See, e.g., Martin v. Wyeth, 96 F. Supp. 689, 695-96 (D. Md.) (holding veteri-
nary process patent invalid), affd, 193 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1951); Morton v. New York
Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865) (holding that use of
ether as general anesthetic failed to meet statutory requirements for patent valid-
ity).
Morton, 17 F. Cas. at 883-84; see also LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.)
156, 175 (1852); Wall v. Leck, 66 F. 552, 557 (9th Cir. 1895) ("[A] natural physical
force, is not the product of inventive skill.").
'2 17 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865).
m Id. at 883-84. A patent will be granted if the applicant can establish that the
invention is the first of its kind (novelty), it is useful (utility), and it is not an obvi-
ous extension of what was already known (non-obviousness). See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-
103 (1994).
' 24 OFF. GAz. PAT. 349 (Comm'r Pat. Off. 1883) (rejecting medical process
patent for treating hemorrhoids due to nonuniform results in treatment), reprinted
in New Decisions, 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 793, 797-98 (1945).
' See Burch, supra note 6, at 1146.
2 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107, 110 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954) ("We do not believe
that [Morton] ... is sufficient to establish ... that all methods involving treatment of
the body are ... not patentable."). Despite the Brinkerhoff court's narrow interpre-
tation of Morton and two failed attempts by Congress to prohibit medical patents,
courts now generally uphold the grant of medical patents. Noonan, supra note 22, at
654; see also Burch, supra note 6, at 1149-51 (examining how courts have broadened
definitions of "process" in upholding medical process patents).
126 96 F. Supp. 689 (D. Md.), affd, 193 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1951).
" Id. at 694. "[Ilt is at least assumed by counsel for both sides in this case that
a medical or surgical method may, if otherwise patentable, be placed in the category
of an art and therefore within reach of the statute." Id. at 695. Beginning with the
1790 Patent Act, the subject matter for a patent included an "art." See Diamond v.
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served that while patent protection has been extended to numer-
ous chemical compounds as part of a therapeutic regimen, valid
medical process patents are rare.'
The judiciary offered its most strenuous defense of the vast
scope of biomedical patents in Diamond v. Chakrabarty."9 In
Diamond, the Supreme Court upheld the broad scope of patent-
able subject matter by holding that genetically engineered mi-
croorganisms were patentable subject material. ° The Court
boldly declared that the broad bounds of patentable subject mat-
ter included "anything under the sun that is made by man."1 '
This broad pronouncement, consistent with the ideals under-
lying patent protection, paved the way for greater scientific
breakthroughs and triumphs. Shortly after Chakrabarty, Har-
vard University applied for and received a patent on a geneti-
cally altered mouse."' Genetically altered animals are now be-
coming a popular method to produce pharmaceutical compounds
for use in therapeutic methods to treat humans. 13'
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182-84 (1981) (discussing historical treatment of processes as
art). The 1952 Patent Act replaced this term with "process." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
The Supreme Court noted, however, that this change did not alter the judicial in-
terpretation of the statute. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 184.
z Martin, 96 F. Supp. at 695.
12 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
'3 Id. at 309.
'Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
The Court reasoned that a broad interpretation of the patent statute was necessary
in light of its "core concept" to protect the unforeseeable fruits of the inventive proc-
ess. Id. at 316.
" U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866, U.S. Patent and Trademark Off., U.S. Dep't of
Com., Index of Patents, pt. I, 1380 (1988). As a result of the genetic manipulation,
the transgenic mouse is abnormally prone to developing breast cancer. Eisenberg,
supra note 64, at 1084. The mice are marketed for approximately $50 each. Laurie
Hays, DuPont Co. to Sell Gene-Spliced Mice to Scientists in Labs Studying Cancer,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1988, at B5. This is the first patent issued for a "higher form
of life." Keith Schneider, Harvard Gets Mouse Patent, A World First, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 13, 1988, at Al. For a detailed discussion of the patentability of genetically-
altered organisms, see Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Non-
use Cost Perspective, 30 HOuS. L. REV. 1597 (1993).
' See Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life,
28 JUBIMETRICS J. 399, 407 (1988) (stating that "transgenic animals are ... expected
to have commercial value in three primary areas: agriculture, biomedical research,
and the pharmaceutical industry"). For a description of this process, known as
"molecular farming," see id. at 408-09. For a detailed discussion of the impact of ge-
netically altered animals on the pharmaceutical industry, see David Manspeizer,
Note, The Cheshire Cat, the March Hare, and the Harvard Mouse: Animal Patents
Open Up a New, Genetically-Engineered Wonderland, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 417
(1991).
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While some experts conclude that congressional action is
unnecessary because the judicial system can prevent potential
abuse in the medical patents arena,"M the political dimensions of
medical patents clearly make it a question best suited for the
legislative process. The courts appear to agree with the latter
proposition.135 Evolving from a mere vague doctrine of misappro-
priation, a vast array of patents currently sustain the legal pro-
tection for biomedical breakthroughs. This development has fu-
eled the debate over the conflict between bioethics and
technology.
V. ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF BIOMEDICAL PATENTS
Medical procedure patents are only one example of an issue
that punctuates the tension between what is ethical and what is
permitted by law.'36 The ethical concerns are certainly legitimate
since many people believe that "alleviating human suffering does
not belong to the area of economic endeavour or trade and com-
merce."'37 The fundamental theory underlying our society, how-
ever, asserts that allowing intellectual property rights in medical
innovation benefits society.'38 The ethical dilemma presented by
these conflicting viewpoints is whether biomedical innovation is
of a special character which should not be patentable. The more
immediate inquiry in recent public debate was the narrower
question of whether society should limit medical technology pat-
ent protection.
"4 Burch, supra note 6, at 1170; see, e.g., Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin
Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945); Martin v. Wyeth, 96 F. Supp.
689 (D. Md.), affd, 193 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1951).
"' Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) ("Congress, not the courts,
must define the limits of patentability .... "); United States v. Dubilier Condenser
Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933) ("[Courts] should not read into the patent laws limi-
tations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.").
'36 "The professional ethics of doctors and surgeons are more consistent with the
widespread use of their medical and surgical discoveries for the benefit of mankind
than in obtaining a monopoly to control their discoveries for personal commercial
advantage." Martin, 96 F. Supp. at 695.
... Wellcome Found., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Patents, 1983 N.Z.L.R. 385, 388
(1983) (citation omitted); see Burch, supra note 6, at 1152-61 (discussing ethical
considerations in context of physician-patient relationship and methodology of
medical science).
... See generally Timothy J. McCoy, Biomedical Process Patents - Should They
be Restricted by Ethical Limitations?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 501-02 (1992) (suggesting
that granting of intellectual property rights in medical innovations is necessary to
continued development of products and techniques which benefit society as whole).
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The tools and skills of the healing arts have long been con-
sidered a "gift from nature to humanity"3 9 which is "held in trust
by physicians and apothecaries for the good of mankind."" ° At
one time it was considered unethical, if not immoral, to keep
such information secret, exploit it for personal gain, or distribute
products to the sick without the advice or consent of a doctor.14 '
Scientific and economic forces, however, drive changes in
health care and its mores. During the health care reform move-
ment, the acceptability of newly patented drug products hinged
on their "degree of commercialism." This attitude represents a
departure from the long-standing position of the AMA which
considered the rise of ready made drug preparations detrimental
to society."4
The medical profession was originally concerned with the
rising number of prominent synthetic drugs and other patented
substances. Echoing the same fears sounded today, physicians
voiced concerns about the anticipated role of a pharmacist and
"the erosion of the doctor's traditional role as final arbiter of his
patient's welfare."' These physicians viewed the availability of
prefabricated elixirs and nostrums as evidence of the decline of
medical education, the profession's public image, and profes-
sional ethics.'45
The pharmaceutical industry similarly opposed the proprie-
tary protection of drugs and medicines. "6 In 1897, the president
139 McTavish, supra note 106, at 343.
10 Id.; see also Joseph M. Reisman, Physicians and Surgeons as Inventors: Rec-
onciling Medical Process Patents and Medical Ethics, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 355, 370
(1995).
The honored ideals of the medical profession imply that the responsibilities
of the physician extend not only to the individual [patient], but also to soci-
ety where these responsibilities deserve [the physician's] interest and par-
ticipation in activities which have the purpose of improving both the health
and the well-being of the individual and the community.
Id. (alteration in original) (citing AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETms § 10 (1971)).
"' McTavish, supra note 106, at 343.
' Id. at 344.
'43 Id. The AMA continues to oppose the issuance of medical process patents.
Sally Squires, AMA Condemns Patents for Medical Procedures, WASH. POST, June
20, 1995, at Al.
144 McTavish, supra note 106, at 349.
'45 A representative of the AMA questioned whether those doctors who pre-
scribed drugs which carried patent or trademark protection could be "distinguished
from the peanut vendor of the street." Id. at 343
' Id. at 344 (noting that the American Pharmaceutical Industry worked closely
with the AMA on reform).
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of the American Pharmaceutical Association proclaimed that all
physicians must avoid any involvement with substances pro-
tected by patent, trademark, or secrecy so that "the nostrum
trade would soon be forced back to the lowest depths of the in-
fernal regions from whence it came."147 This reaction was based
upon the understanding that a majority of these protected sub-
stances could otherwise be easily and inexpensively duplicated
by pharmacists.4 '
As patented drugs became a medical mainstay, the debate
shifted to other aspects of health care delivery. The 1953 edition
of the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics stated that it was un-
ethical for physicians to patent medical devices such as instru-
ments and appliances.'49 Today, this prohibition is no longer in
place and, it is ethical, according to the AMA, for physicians to
patent medical devices. 5 °
Public debate also focused upon another aspect of health
care delivery, namely, medical techniques and process patents.
The congressional testimony of Dr. H. Dunbar Hoskins, Jr. of the
American Academy of Ophthalmology clarified the position of the
profession: "[Physicians] are not against patenting the scalpel.
We are against patenting the incision made with the scalpel. We
are not against patenting the thermometer. We are against pat-
enting the method by which it is used to take our tempera-
ture. 15'
Despite the long history supporting medical procedure pat-
ents, experts conclude that these patents have had little legal
147 McTavish, supra note 106, at 344 (citing Frank E. Stewart, 29 JAMA 356
(1897)).
14 McTavish, supra note 106, at 344. The battle ensnared even the most impor-
tant medical discoveries. The American diphtheria antitoxin patent by Emil von Be-
hring was condemned as "an attempt to blackmail suffering humanity in the inter-
est of a foreign manufacturer." Id. at 348.
"9 Pallin Hearings, supra note 16, at 6.
15 See Squires, supra note 143, at Al (discussing AMA's vehement condemna-
tion of medical procedure patents).
'"' Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act: Hearings on H.R. 1127
Before the Subcom. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, at 2 (testimony of Dr. H. Dunbar Hoskins, Jr.) [hereinafter Hoskins Hear-
ings]. Medical professionals are not immune to the pressures imposed by their fel-
low practitioners to condemn the practice of patenting medical procedures. Patent
applicant Dr. Pallin admitted that he was cautioned to avoid patenting his proce-
dure as a pure medical process. Rather, he was advised to develop an instrument to
utilize during the process and receive royalties through the use of the device as op-
posed to the procedure. Pallin Hearings, supra note 16, at 6.
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importance or economic value.'52 These experts rely primarily
upon the paucity of lawsuits seeking to enforce procedure pat-
ents. Procedure patents, however, are rarely enforced for several
reasons: (1) it is extremely difficult to monitor and detect in-
fringement of process patents; (2) it is even harder to stop such
infringement considering the thousands of clinics and practi-
tioners in practice; and (3) the ethical dimensions of medical
process patents reside in their true implications on patient care
and its cost, not upon the amount of litigation surrounding their
enforcement.
A. Patient Care
One of the most important ethical questions raised in the
debate concerning medical procedure patents is whether these
patents interfere with patient care." During congressional tes-
timony, objections were raised asserting that medicine's special
character counseled against patenting medical procedures.'
These opponents argued that patents change the physician-
patient relationship since inherent in the patent is the patentee's
right to exclude others from an innovation. A patent would
therefore limit a physician's choice of care and infringe upon the
ability of patients to choose their physician. Additional ques-
tions arise concerning the efficacy of these procedures. Unlike
certified drugs, the lack of a procedure certification process leads
to uncertainty for physicians since the doctor must determine
whether a given procedure accomplishes the claimed result.'55
It is critically important to remember the context in which
this debate arises. Notwithstanding patents, the discretion and
autonomy of doctors are never absolute. The ethical debate over
medical process patents must address whether they are merely
52 See Noonan Hearings, supra note 111, at 4-7.
' There are numerous additional patient care issues facing the medical pro-
fession; including confidentiality, insurance limits that may prevent coverage, and
problematic restrictions arising from a covenant against competition. See, e.g., Vas-
cular & Gen. Surgical Assocs., Ltd. v. Loiterman, 599 N.E.2d 1246, 1251 (11. App.
Ct. 1992) (enforcing two year restriction on vascular surgeon's right to practice);
Medical Specialists, Inc. v. Sleweon, 652 N.E.2d 517, 522 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
(enforcing restrictive covenant in contract of infectious-disease specialist). See gen-
erally Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contractual Re-
strictions on Right of Medical Practitioner to Practice, Incident to Employment
Agreement, 62 A.L.R.3d 1014 (1975).
IU Kelman Hearings, supra note 18, at 6.
Burch, supra note 6, at 1160.
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another tool alongside drug and medical device patents. The
ethical debate must also consider whether such protection ad-
vances the overall public health and is consistent with other
limits imposed upon the responsibilities of a physician."'
The medical debate must also confront the underlying eco-
nomic reality. The opponents of process patents couch their at-
tacks in the economic terms of consumer cost and access. In
reality, process patents are far less costly than the costs of drugs
and medical devices.157 Dr. Pallin explained to Congress that
drug and medical device royalties will "always contribute to the
cost of care far more dramatically than a few medical" patents. 58
Another patent expert testified that "patenting medical devices
raises virtually all the same social costs as does patenting medi-
cal methods." 59
B. Litigation Over Patent Infringement
The AMA's recent Report of the Council of Ethical and Judi-
cial Affairs makes several revealing points about the crisis in the
profession. The Report indicates that the primary issue con-
fronting the profession is not that physicians are obtaining pat-
ents on medical procedures. Rather, the current controversy ex-
ists because doctors are suing one another to enforce economic
rights relating to patents. The Pallin case, noted as one of the
first of its kind on record, reveals that this trend has serious
implications on the perception of physicians' professionalism.
Physicians fear that they will be held liable as process pat-
ent infringers without notice of their infringement. These phy-
sicians believe that medical devices and pharmaceuticals are
items whose royalties have been paid by a manufacturer and,
therefore, may be used without any concern of infringement li-
ability. These physicians reason that a medical device or phar-
maceutical compound comes virtually ready to use out of the box
and does not pose uncertainty concerning authenticity or satis-
faction of royalty and licensing payments obligations. While a
physician who lacks notice may inadvertently perform a pat-
'56 Id. at 1154 n.85. "[T]wo wrongs do not make a right" and permitting addi-
tional limits on physician autonomy is not justified merely because some limitations
already exist. Id.
157 Pallin Hearings, supra note 16, at 5 (testimony of Dr. Samuel Pallin).
158 Id.
159 Dunner Hearings, supra note 17, at 4.
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ented technique, it is highly unlikely that a physician would con-
struct and use an article, and hence infringe a patent. Physi-
cians therefore believe that they are immune from patent in-
fringement since the articles in hospitals and doctors' offices are
presumed legitimate and bona fide. The popular belief is that
any risk of patent infringement lies exclusively with the manu-
facturers and distributors, not the practitioners.
Dr. Jack Singer, a practitioner and defendant in the most
recent ophthalmological litigation, also testified before Congress.
He explained that his suit with Dr. Pallin arose from his inde-
pendent development of the identical cataract procedure. Dr.
Singer warned of the dangers involved in issuing medical process
patents: "Medical method patents will produce a spiraling infla-
tion of health care costs by inhibiting the free exchange of infor-
mation and by adding the cost of license fees, royalty payments,
and patent applications."160 He further warned of the financial
costs imposed upon presumably innocent doctors' unknowing in-
fringement upon medical patents.'61
This perception is based on an unfortunate and incomplete
understanding of the law. Under the doctrine of contributory in-
fringement, physicians are liable for patent infringement if they
use counterfeit patented drugs or devices.62 This is a risk that
physicians already face. The new medical process patent law,
applied prospectively, does not insulate doctors from the in-
fringement of those innovations that have already been awarded
a patent.'63
In sum, the ethical concern is not patient care. It is not pa-
tient cost. It is the ethics of infringement liability. Quite legiti-
mately, the medical profession is concerned about an erosion of
control and the risk of litigation.
C. Alternatives to the Sub-Section 287(c) Moratorium
The ultimate response to objections voiced by the experts
condemning protection of medical device and process patents is
... Singer Hearings, supra note 14 (summary of testimony of Dr. Jack A.
Singer).
161 Id.
162 See 1 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 17.02(2)(b) (discussing basic principles of
doctrine of contributory negligence).
'e' Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110
Stat. 3009, 3011 (1996) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(4)).
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found in the fundamental objectives of the patent system. Pat-
ents foster the development of inherent societal benefits by ad-
vancing the progress of medical knowledge, improving public
health, quality of life, and efficient care delivery. Patents attract
much needed private research funding. T' Any ethical debate
concerning the patentability of medical devices and processes
must consider the risks in prohibiting patents; cures, therapies,
and new surgical techniques may never be discovered, and con-
sequently never reach the public.
The ethical implications of issuing biomedical patents also
raise many philosophical questions. One such question is
whether the boundaries of science have been pushed too far.
Once a new procedure is developed or a fundamental science is
discovered, such as genetically treating cancer or Alzheimer's
disease, it is difficult to restrict that technology. Some of these
technologies are troubling because they are not purely therapeu-
tic in nature. Futurists predict that the alternate uses of thera-
pies may be cosmetic in nature, like changing one's eye color, or
even reminiscent of eugenics, such as choosing the features of
unborn children.'65
Of course, ethics imply the existence of a choice. E. R.
Squibb declined to patent his improved method for manufactur-
ing anesthetic ether because he believed that this discovery was
too important not to share freely with the world.'66 Similarly, the
medical profession does not have to adopt the most drastic forms
of retaliation which hurt the public. Congress has several ave-
nues available to modify the patent system to meet the ethically
troubling concerns raised without a radical departure from prior
law.
The first option that Congress explored was the imposition
of a strict moratorium on the issuance of medical device and
process patents. In 1995, Congress considered HR 1127, a pro-
posal to restrict completely the availability of patent protection
'" Burch, supra note 6, at 1158; Fern Schumer Chapman, Going for Gold in the
Baby Business, FORTUNE, Sept. 17, 1984, at 42 (asserting that "private capital could
find its way into ... medical research if investors can look to high returns from pat-
entable procedures").
'" This type of human gene therapy, known as "enhancement therapy," involves
the "modification of cells to produce different character traits ... [such as] height,
hair color, eye color, [and] intelligence." See Diane E. Hoffmann, The Biotechnology
Revolution and its Regulatory Evolution, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 471, 482 (1989).
'" McTavish, supra note 106, at 348 n.14.
[Vol. 71:329
PATIENTS v. PATENTS
for medical devices and processes. Patent expert Dr. Noonan
testified that the moratorium on medical and surgical procedures
patents which H.R. 1127 sought was an overbroad response to an
alleged problem which would effectively change the scope of pat-
entable subject matter." Instead, he suggested that tension in
this area may be alleviated through the enactment of a
"compulsory licensing provision that would require an owner of a
therapeutic or diagnostic procedure patent to license the tech-
nology at a reasonable royalty.""s While the radical policy of a
strict moratorium sought by H.R. 1127 was not enacted, the
change in § 287 represents a significant departure.
As a second option, lawmakers could also retain the present
scope of patentable subject matter, while merely modifying the
base term of medical process patents or prohibiting future term
extensions. This would temper frustration by altering the pric-
ing horizon and balancing the ability to recoup investment capi-
tal with restricting competition. Unfortunately, this is unlikely
to be a politically favored solution. This alternative merely miti-
gates, but does not solve, the underlying problem since the risks
of infringement and associated problems remain, albeit through
a smaller window of time.
Another alternative to a complete moratorium is merely to
limit the scope of the restriction. Congress could allow medical
procedure patents only for those techniques that require FDA
approval.6 ' This compromise preserves the benefit of uniformity
throughout the subject matter of the patent system and provides
physicians with some notice of proprietary methods.'7 0
The present ethical dilemma facing lawmakers may ulti-
mately be rendered moot as a result of the continued efforts of
the United States to harmonize its patent system with the sys-
tems adopted by the rest of the world.' More than 80 nations
'" See Noonan, supra note 22, at 663 (contending that outright ban on patenting
medical and surgical procedures may be overbroad).
1 Id. at 664.
Noonan Hearings, supra note 111, at 12.
170 Congress ultimately adopted this approach. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616,
110 Stat. 3009, 3011 (1996).
71 According to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin G. Hatch, the
global trade implications are of serious consequence. See 142 CONG. REC. S11845
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (asserting that proposed Ganske-Fiske amendment under-
cuts GATT by inviting other nations to amend their patent laws to prevent world-
wide enforcement of U.S. patents); see also 138 CONG. REC. S5288, 5289 (daily ed.
Apr. 9, 1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (noting significant international efforts
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around the world refuse to recognize medical and surgical pat-
ents. 2 The European Patent Convention, for example, expressly
prohibits patents for "Im]ethods for treatment of the human or
animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods prac-
tised on the human or animal body."1'3 It may be inappropriate,
however, to cite the foreign experience within the context of a
medical patent moratorium since the foreign approach illustrates
the free rider problem. The entire world may be benefiting from
the inventive and research efforts of companies in the United
States that are made possible by the traditional and historic
scope and effects of our patent laws. 4
In addition to the free rider dilemma, the inconsistency be-
tween the different approaches adopted by the United States and
other foreign nations creates trade issues. One such issue arises
under the GATT agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights ("TRIPS")."6 Under TRIPS, signatory na-
tions may prohibit patents for reasons relating to public order,
morality, and protection of the environment.7 6 Hence, a signa-
tory nation could deny patent protection for any diagnostic,
therapeutic, and surgical methods of humans or animals.77
Medical procedure patents are not the only variation be-
to harmonize patent laws); Robert W. Pritchard, The Future is Now - The Case for
Patent Harmonization, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 291, 291 n.1 & 299-311
(1995) (discussing progress in patent harmonization movements).
'7 See 142 CONG. REC. H8276, H8277 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Ganske) (noting that "80 countries around the world, including most of Europe,
expressly prohibit medical patents"); 141 CONG. REC. S15291, S15292 (daily ed. Oct.
18, 1995) (statement of Sen. Frist); Hoskins Hearings, supra note 151, at 8.
13 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Conven-
tion), Oct. 5, 1973, art. 52, 33 I.L.M. 270, 285.
174 No fewer than 71 Americans have received the Nobel Prize for the category
"Physiology or Medicine" since its establishment in 1905. 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA 393-94 (1994).
'75 See 142 CONG. REC. S11845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (asserting that Gaske-Fiske amendment undercuts TRIPS).
"6 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex 1B, art.
XIV, 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1177 (establishing exceptions to GATT provisions for purposes
of public order, morality, and health); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, Annex 1C, art. 27, cl. 2, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1208
(providing that members of treaty may exclude from patentability inventions to pro-
tect public order, morality, and environment); see also Hoskins Hearings, supra note
151, at 7.
177 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex
1c, art. 27, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1208 (allowing members to refuse grant of
patent for diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for treatment of humans or
animals); Hoskins Hearings, supra note 151, at 7 (citing Article 27 of TRIPS).
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tween the United States patent system and patent systems of
other countries. One feature absent from the United States pat-
ent system, but common throughout the world, is prior user
rights.78 The enactment of prior user rights in the United States
would be a narrowly tailored alternative. It would alleviate ten-
sions in the medical patent arena while leaving the traditional
scope of patentable subject matter intact. The enactment of
prior user rights also has the benefit of generally improving the
overall functioning of the United States patent system.
VI. PRIOR USER RIGHTS
Another patent reform introduced in the 104th Congress was
the "Prior Domestic Commercial Use Act of 1995."" 9 Proponents
of this measure argued that enacting prior user rights will im-
prove the patent system and spur increased progress in the sci-
ences and arts while conferring benefits to the public.18 Critics,
however, reiterated their arguments used in the past to defeat
similar congressional proposals and portrayed the proposal as a
radical change that would "turn the entire patent system 'on its
ear.' "181
In light of the historical dovetail between patents and trade
secrets, this Part asserts that: (1) the active commercial users of
trade secrets confer a benefit to the public; (2) current United
States law under-acknowledges the protective rights that trade
secret users deserve; (3) prior user rights enhance trade secret
protection; (4) trade secret users deserve limited protective
178 See Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial Per-
spective, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 689, 703-04 (1996) (stating that al-
though United States does not offer prior user rights, the concept is common in
Europe).
1"9 H.R. 2235, 104th Cong. (1995).
m Proponents contend that enacting prior user rights would further the pur-
pose underlying the grant of patent protection embodied in the Constitution. See
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that Congress shall have power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); see
also Paul R. Morico, Are Prior User Rights Consistent with Federal Patent Policy?:
The U.S. Considers Legislation to Adopt Prior User Rights, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 572, 580 (1996) (concluding that legislation to adopt prior user rights
promote "the progress of science").
8 Robert Rines & Skip Kaltenheuser, Proposed Patent Laws Would Harm In-
ventors, NATL L.J., Nov. 28, 1994, at A23; see also Chris P. Konkol, Prior-Invention
Rights: The Excluded Middle, 77 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 666, 672 (1995)
(demonstrating how prior user rights may undermine U.S. patent system).
1997]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
rights against subsequent patent holders; and, (5) limited prior
user rights are the equitable protection for these trade secret us-
ers and enhance the current balance between patents and trade
secrets.
A. Current United States Practices
Although politically controversial, prior user rights are sim-
ply a limited legal defense against patent infringement.'82 Under
the current system, an inventor who is awarded a patent has
exclusive rights to make, sell, and use an invention, even against
those persons who independently and unknowingly produce the
same innovation." In our "winner-takes-all" system, an inven-
tor who relied on trade secrecy to protect her invention may find
herself infringing on another person's patent that was awarded
on that same discovery."M
It is an established rule of United States law that a patentee
is the "winner" and takes credit for the invention, even if the dis-
covery was first made by another.'85 The Supreme Court enunci-
ated this rule in Bates v. Coe:
Inventors may, if they can, keep their invention secret; and if
they do for any length of time, they do not forfeit their right to
apply for a patent, unless another in the mean time has made
the invention, and secured by patent the exclusive right to
make, use, and vend the patented improvement. Within that
rule and subject to that condition, inventors may delay to apply
'8 See Vito J. DeBari, International Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed
Solution to the United States' First-to-File Debate, 16 FORDHAM Ir' L.J. 687, 694
(1993) (noting that prior user rights "provide[] a limited defense against patent in-
fringement claims" to a person who used or prepared to use invention before filing a
patent); Kyla Harriel, Prior User Rights in a First-To-Invent Patent System: Why
Not?, 36 IDEA 543, 546 (1996) (stating that person who is sued for patent infringe-
ment may raise limited defense of prior user rights).
183 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994) (providing that patentee, or his heirs or assigns, has
right to prevent others from making, using, or selling his invention within United
States); F. Andrew Ubel, Who's on First - The Trade Secret Prior User or a Subse-
quent Patentee, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 401, 407 (1994) (recognizing
that U.S. system prevents good faith inventor from using his invention).
'" Ubel, supra note 183, at 407 (stating that winner takes all system may result
in enjoining of bona fide inventor from use of his own invention).
185 See Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 46 (1878); Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.)
477, 496 (1850) ("[T]he party who invents is not strictly speaking the first and origi-




for a patent.' 8
Prior user rights are deemed to establish an equitable bal-
ance by splitting the patentee's bundle of rights between the in-
ventor who first uses the invention but foregoes filing for a pat-
ent, and the subsequent inventor who filed for and received a
patent.
The United States is one of the few nations whose patent
system relies on a "first-to-invent" regime, awarding priority to
the first true inventor in time.87 By contrast, most other nations
use a "first-to-file" system, awarding priority in rights to whom-
ever first fies a patent application." A "first-to-invent" system
is laudable because it is rooted in the American tradition of in-
dividualism and prevents the inequitable results that may occur
if inventors are forced to race to file patent applications at the
PTO. 89
Patents and trade secrets, as noted earlier, dovetail and
hence serve complementary roles in fostering innovation and
guarding against the risks of inventive investment. The decision
whether to patent an invention or pursue protection through
prior user rights can be a matter of business or personal judg-
ment.9 ' In determining whether to apply for a patent, the inven-
tor weighs several factors, including whether the statutory re-
quirements are satisfied, the expense and burden of an
application, and the means available to best protect inventive in-
vestment. Inventors whose products can be inspected or reverse
engineered by the public risk easy copying; therefore, these arti-
c8 Bates, 98 U.S. at 46.
"8 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1994) (providing that patent shall not be issued to
person who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented").
m See Doris Estelle Long, The Protection of Information Technology in a Cul-
turally Diverse Marketplace, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 129, 142 n.47
(1996) (stating that only United States and Philippines use first-to-invent regime).
' See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1272 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that
first-to-invent system "respects the value of the individual in American tradition"
and avoids unfairness that may result from race to PTO) (quoting Final Report of
the Advisory Committee on Industrial Innovation, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Sept.
1979, p. 174).
m Prior User Rights (Relative to Patents): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on In-
tellectual Property and Judicial Admin. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd
Cong. 6 (1994) (testimony of Bruce A. Lehman, Commissioner of PTO) (noting that
under certain circumstances, it may be commercially sound for manufacturer to
forego patent protection and to rely solely upon trade secrecy to protect invention)
[hereinafter Prior User].
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cles are prime candidates for patent protection.' 9' In contrast,
processes or products which are beyond public inspection or in-
ternally utilized within a firm are likely choices for some type of
trade secrecy, in lieu of a patent.
Under current United States law, the prior disclosed use of
an invention is a method of defeating a patent application.'92
Disclosed activity includes the public sale of a product or the
public use of a product for more than one year. 9' Such disclosure
may cause the technology to be regarded as "prior art."
94
A conflict exists between trade secrets and patents under
United States law where prior disclosure defeats a patent while
undisclosed innovation may not lead to such a result. The un-
disclosed activity counts against the first inventor but does not
necessarily bar the second subsequent inventor from receiving a
patent. Further, the law does not recognize the prior non-
disclosed use as a defense to a patent infringement action
brought by the subsequent inventor. Hence, the prior user can-
not obtain a patent and, worse yet, is precluded from continuing
to use the technology since the first inventor is subject to the ex-
clusive rights of the second inventor.
The following example clarifies the fundamental fairness
dilemma that prior user rights seek to solve. The primary goal
underlying the United States patent system is the fostering of
innovation that benefits the public. These laws also seek to re-
ward the first inventor who benefits the public. When several
inventors make the same discovery, our patent laws dictate sev-
eral possible consequences. One inventor's actions may negate
the patentability of the invention for all parties. The actual first
inventor who kept his invention a secret may have to forfeit all of
his rights and yield to the second inventor. Prior user rights
may resolve this dilemma. Apropos of King Solomon's wisdom,
prior user rights allow for an equitable decision. A prior party
191 See id. at 92 (statement of R. Carl Moy) (proposing statutory clarification
that would render information available through reverse-engineering in public use
and suggesting that 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) may already categorize such information
as public use).
192 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (providing that person is not entitled to patent
if invention was known or used by others or described in publication before appli-
cant's invention).
'9 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
'9 See Ubel, supra note 183, at 405-06 (stating that prior use may or may not be




who is using an invention before the filing date of another party
wins the limited rights to continue the use, despite the issuance
of the patent to another inventor. Although this is a departure
from current United States practice, it is deemed equitable.'95
Medical procedure patents are within that class in nature
that may be best protected through some combination of inven-
tions and trade secrecy. An instrument, like a new type of
stethoscope, may be viewed, analyzed, dissected, or reverse engi-
neered. Since such public access facilitates copying, the inven-
tor's rights would be best protected by a patent. An operation, in
contrast, occurs within a sequestered environment shielded from
public inspection. An innovative procedure, therefore, could be
protected by several different means, including secrecy.
In the Pallin medical patent procedure infringement case,
for example, several of the defendants claimed that they used the
medical process before Pallin's patent application.'98 If United
States patent law acknowledged prior user rights, the results of
that conflict would have been entirely different. The defendants
would have been shielded from liability and the claims of the
patent-holder would not have been challenged and instead would
have been subsequently invalidated.'97
B. Potential Benefits
Since the United States does not acknowledge prior user
rights, there is no domestic experience or judicial precedent
available to guide policy-makers.' Predicting the impact on our
"' In evaluating the possible inequitable results from an inventor forgoing pat-
ent protection in lieu of available alternatives, the Seventh Circuit noted that "it
would be unjust to hold that such an election should impair his right to continue
diligent efforts to market the product of his own invention." Dunlop Holdings Ltd. v.
Ram Golf Corp., 524 F.2d 33, 37 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that public use of golf balls
made with special coating forecloses finding of hidden use even though use did not
disclose inventive concept).
"' See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text.
Some may question whether prior user rights would even apply to those
medical processes originating from universities and hospitals. This question, how-
ever, has not been squarely addressed due to the lack of experience with this pro-
posal. These facilities are likely to be considered sufficiently commercial to qualify
for prior user rights since medicine is considered an applied field, rather than a ba-
sic science. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INvENTivE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 623 (1962) (suggesting that profit-incentive of research in uni-
versities and hospitals should be replaced by government control and funding).
'3S In a statement to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property
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society from the adoption of a prior user protection requires fo-
cusing on foreign experiences with these rights, economic theory,
and the views presented before Congress.
Unfortunately, the foreign experience with prior user rights
proves a difficult yardstick in measuring this impact. First, for-
eign patents are unlike their American counterparts due to the
fundamental differences in many features, such as the individual
nations' claiming systems, which may affect the economic value
of protected patents.'99 The economic value of overseas patents,
therefore, may not justify pursuing infringement litigation for
many inventions in situations where prior user rights protected
the innovation.00 Second, while many nations have patent sys-
tems that grant prior user rights, all of the foreign prior user
regimes vary with regard to important characteristics, such as
the scope of the rights and the ability to transfer or license the
right to another party or firm.0''
In the United States, proponents of prior user rights posit
several reasons why domestic law should encompass prior user
rights. First, prior user rights are a fair, efficient, and equitable
defense. Second, adoption of these rights furthers the effort to
and Judicial Administration, Professor Robert P. Merges noted the paucity of Euro-
pean cases involving prior user rights. Prior User, supra note 190, at 40 (statement
of Robert P. Merges). For example, prior user rights were never raised as a defense
in England during the first 14 years since their creation; in Italy the defense was
not asserted for over 13 years; and merely 4 cases were reported in France over the
past 20 years. Id. at 41.
' See Toshiko Takenaka, Doctrine of Equivalents After Hilton Davis: A Com-
parative Law Analysis, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 479, 502 & nn.143-44
(1996) (noting that United States utilizes peripheral claiming system rather than
central claiming system utilized by majority of other countries, most notably Japan
and Germany) [hereinafter Doctrine of Equivalents]. A central claiming system re-
quires a patentee to define the underlying inventive principle or solution in the lan-
guage of the patent claims. Id. at 503. Under a peripheral claiming system, the
scope of a patent is more narrowly determined by the language of the claim itself.
Toshiko Takenaka, INTERPRETING PATENT CLAIMS: THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY,
AND JAPAN 113-34 (17 IIC Studies-Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright
Law 1995); Doctrine of Equivalents, supra, at 503.
20 Telephone interview with Prof. R. Carl Moy, Professor of Law, William
Mitchell College of Law (Dec. 12, 1996).
" See Robert L. Rohrback, Prior User Rights: Roses or Thorns?, 2 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 35-36 (1993) (listing various prior user rights regimes adopted
by countries). Canada and Italy are among the countries which limit the prior user
rights according to the scope and extent of commercialization. Id. at 35. Japan and
Mexico grant prior user rights without any apparent transfer limitation. Id. The




harmonize the United States patent system with the rest of the
world."2 Third, these rights would eliminate the disparate
treatment between corporations in the United States and foreign
firms."3 Finally, adoption of such rights also resolves certain
conflicts between trade secrecy and patentability that have
merged to frustrate firms, especially within the software indus-
try.
4
Several powerful trade arguments further support the en-
actment of prior user rights. Currently, American markets are
more open to foreign imports, and forty-five percent of United
States patents issued each year are from overseas inventors.2 05 A
nation that grants prior user rights exclusively for its domestic
firms will likely experience a shift in the balance of international
trade in its favor.0 8 Prior user rights would also help transfer
wealth from foreign patentees to domestic firms since the largest
number of consumers of United States intellectual property are
arguably Americans. In any event, domestic job creation would
be spurred. Prior user rights would help temper the frustration
that Americans feel for foreign inventors. For example, public
sentiment strongly opposed German and other foreign drug
manufacturers who were recouping royalty profits on aspirin and
other compounds.07
In terms of some strategic aspects of commercialization,
prior user rights help resolve some of the balkanization among
2 Prior User, supra note 190, at 75 (testimony of William D. Budinger, Chair-
man, Rodel, Inc.) (noting differences between American and foreign patent systems
by stating, "[ilf you patent only in the United States, you give everybody else a free
cookbook on how to practice your invention [while unfortunately] the cost of patent-
ing overseas is so huge").
2 See id. at 62-63 (noting that "American manufacturers are not operating on a
level playing field with their foreign competitors," but prior user rights "will correct
the oblem").See id. at 7 (testimony of Bruce Lehman) ("[P]rior user defense could help
resolve concerns that have been expressed in the software industry ... regarding
prior use of poorly'documented techniques that are later patented by another.").2"' See Changes in U.S. Patent Law and Their Implications for Energy and En-
vironment Research and Development: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy
and Env't of the House Comm. on Science, 104th Cong. (1996), at 1996 WL 241728,
at *7 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Dir., Amer. Intell. Prop. L. Assoc.)
(stating that forty-five percent of all U.S. patent applications are foreign and per-
haps half of remainder are also filed abroad); Prior User, supra note 190, at 80
(testimony of R. Carl Moy) (stating that "40 to 45 percent of our patents are being
taken out by foreigners").20' Prior User, supra note 190, at 86 (statement of R. Carl Moy).
217 See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
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the varying trade secret laws of the fifty states. Any change in
the patent statute, such as the adoption of prior user rights,
benefits national uniformity within the United States legal sys-
tem. Unification, arguably one of the principal federal objectives
of our intellectual property system, offers an important advan-
tage in terms of domestic legal policy. From a legal, economic,
and a practical perspective, certainty is another important do-
mestic policy that will be advanced with prior user rights which,
in turn, guards the return on inventive investment.
The populist argument asserts that an additional benefit of
prior user rights is the insulation of inventors from the expense
and complexity of the present legal system and its painful litiga-
tion scenarios. °8 Unfortunately, this prediction proves doubtful.
Practitioners note that proponents of prior user rights criticize
the current system as insufficiently protecting their innovations
when the fault in fact lies with inventors who failed to seek
proper patent counsel, or obtained incorrect legal advice, will-
fully or negligently avoided the patent, or harbored a disdain of
the patent system.2 "9 These proponents fail to recognize that
prior user rights are a defense, not a complete immunization
from litigation.
Unfortunately, many of the problems cited in this critique of
the patent system are more directly related to problems of cur-
rent litigation practices, such as expense, limited discovery, or
over-crowded dockets, rather than the substance of patent law.21
The essence of the substantive issues allegedly plaguing the pat-
ent system relates to risks of invention, including technological,
financial, and legal uncertainty.
21
'
C. The Scope of the Right
The 1994 prior user rights legislative proposal grants rights
to those who have commercially used the subject matter before
208 Keith M. Kupferschmid, Prior User Rights: The Inventor's Lottery Ticket, 21
AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Assoc. Q.J. 213, 224 (1993) (noting that both patent holders
and prior users will benefit from foregone litigation costs as result of adoption of
prior user rights); Testimony Before the House of Representatives Comm. on Judici-
ary Intellectual Property & Judicial Admin., 1994 WL 499999, at *9-10, Sept. 13,
1994 (testimony of Bruce A. Lehman, Chairman, PTO).
209 See Rohrback, supra note 201, at 6.
210 Id. at 19-20. The author cites 20 reasons against implementing prior user
rights in the United States, 16 of which relate to litigation. Id. at 13-19.
211 Id. at 16.
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the effective filing date of another's patent."u This is a change in
the way the current system views novel inventions. Novelty is
currently one of the principal statutory requirements for a pat-
ent.213 Prior user rights would resolve certain inequitable ambi-
guities concerning the novelty requirement which have arisen
under the existing patent law.
When an inventor does not diligently take steps to protect
her work, the invention may develop into "prior art" and, there-
fore, fail to meet the novelty requirement. Under the current
law's novelty requirements, applicants lose the right to a patent
if the invention was already patented, known, described, or in
public use before the application.2 " Judging novelty requires an
assessment of what is within the scope and content of the public
domain and, hence is "prior art." The law reflects the underlying
federal policy to keep those inventions and discoveries benefiting
the public in continued use. Among the public benefits derived
from the novelty requirement is increased commercial activity.
The public is also protected from potentially disruptive economic
dislocation where a patent unexpectedly issues and knocks-out
the user of a technology by changing their market power or pre-
venting their use. In addition to innovation and commercializa-
tion, another potential benefit is the promoting of the principal
federal policy of competition by narrowing the patent monopoly
and allowing another competitor to enter the market.
2'2 H.R. 2235, 104th Cong. § 273(b)(1) (1995).
213 35 U.S.C. § 102 et. seq. (1994).
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or pat-
ented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country,
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country,
more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in
the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in
this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or con-
cealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be consid-
ered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to prac-
tice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was
first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to
conception by the other.
Id.
214 See supra note 213.
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Prior user rights also comport with all the major property
and economic law theories previously discussed. In particular, a
firm whose inventive efforts are protected from economic dislo-
cations has its inventive investment guarded consistent with the
legal "prospect theory."215 Prior commercial users enjoy an effi-
cient mode of safeguarding their inventive efforts under the
"innovation theory" of intellectual property.216 Facilitating the
development of an environment where inventions are put to use
will ultimately lead to an increased storehouse of public knowl-
edge where the know-how of employees is disseminated.2 7 The
storehouse of knowledge is enriched as the trade secret inevita-
bly, as history demonstrates, leaks into the public domain.
The threshold issue judging an invention's novelty is the
character of its use. The initial inquiry is whether a prior use is
a public use, which bars a patent after one year.1 8 In addition,
courts must inquire whether the inventor engaged in activities
designed to bring about public or commercial use of the inven-
tion, which is also sufficient to create a bar to a patent after one
year.
219
Any determination regarding the character of an invention's
use-public versus experimental-rests on a host of factors in-
volving all relevant circumstances.' 9 The point at which an in-
vention leaves the inventor's research sphere and truly enters
the public is not easily judged. The use of the invention of a new
corset, for instance, worn by only one woman and beyond all
public view, was once deemed a public use.221 Yet the construc-
21' See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
216 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 64 & 65 and accompanying text.
218 Gillman v. Stem, 114 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1940).
219 Del Mar Eng'g Lab. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1178, 1185 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
220 TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir.
1984). Among the factors to be considered are
whether payment is made for the device, whether a user agreed to use se-
cretly, whether records were kept of progress, whether persons other than
the inventor conducted the asserted experiments, how many tests were
conducted, [and] how long the testing period was in relationship to tests of
other similar devices.
Id.
221 Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337 (1881). But see id. at 339 (Miller, J.,
dissenting) ("If the little steel spring inserted in a single pair of corsets, and used by
only one woman, covered by her outer-clothing, and in a position always withheld
from public observation, is a public use of that piece of steel, I am at a loss to know
the line between a private and a public use.") (emphasis omitted).
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tion and use of a new public road was considered to be experi-
mental.'
Notice that while a use may be public, it may also be secret
or hidden. It is said of this legal threshold, "[m]aking the inven-
tion publicly known requires only that the public enjoy the bene-
fits or the use of the prior invention."' In addition to public use,
there are a range of other activities that result in the forfeiture
of novelty under § 102(g)-abandonment, concealment, and sup-
pression. As with the determination of public use, there are a
variety of factors to consider in judging whether novelty is de-
feated on the aforementioned grounds. Unfortunately, no defi-
nite meaning of "suppressed, or concealed" as prescribed in §
102(g) has developed under the case law.Y Any determination
as to whether an inventor has "suppressed or concealed" an in-
vention has been deemed a matter of law, not a finding of fact,
leading to some difficulty in the statute's application.' While a
use may be a public use, it is also possible that such use is hid-
den in character, and thus does not inform the public or cause
disclosure. 6 Such a public use that does not disclose the inven-
tive concept may lead to a patent bar due to a loss of novelty un-
der § 102(g).22
Secrecy surrounding an invention leads to an array of inter-
esting consequences. The secret inventor who has neither taught
the art to the public nor enriched the public storehouse of knowl-
edge, is not considered the "first inventor."' The abandonment
of an invention does not create "prior art," but is said to establish
"lost art," as if only waiting to be discovered again by another.
Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134-36 (1877).
Friction Div. Prods., Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 658 F. Supp. 998,
1013-14 (D. Del. 1987) (citing Del Mar Eng'g, 524 F.2d at 1185).
'A Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1279 (Fed Cir. 1985) (Rich, J., concurring).
The statute reflects the intent to codify prior case law pertaining to priority deter-
minations in interference or infringement cases. Id. Thus, one must look to the facts
of prior cases to ascertain the true meaning of the words. Id.
Id. at 1280.
22 See Dunlop Holdings Ltd. v. Ram Golf Corp., 524 F.2d 33, 37 (7th Cir. 1975)
(holding that "a public use of an invention forecloses a finding of suppression or con-
cealment even though the use does not disclose the discovery").
2'7See Palmer v. Dudzik, 481 F.2d 1377, 1387 (C.C.P.A_ 1973) (holding that
finding of concealment under § 102(g) is warranted despite commercial use of in-
vention where such use conveys no knowledge of invention to public).
2Gilman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1940) (concluding that keeping
manufacturing invention secret, except to secure agents to sell end product, pre-
cluded finding that inventor was "first inventor").
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Observers conclude that "b]y definition a trade secret has not
been placed in the public domain." 9
Strictly speaking, a truly secret use, one quarantined from
the outside world, is not a public use."o In an industrial context,
the determination of a commercial use considers the relationship
between employees and members of the public. The rule as
stated in Metallizing Engineering Co., is that a commercial use is
a public use even if its use is kept secret."' Congressional wit-
nesses warned that while this broad rule has caused difficulty,
Congress should avoid enacting broad legislation overruling the
case. 32 Thus far Congress has heeded that warning and adhered
to the principals set forth in that case. As a result, the commer-
cial character of a use may be sufficient to deem it a public use.
229 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974). A trade secret
cannot be protected by a patent and retain its character as a secret because such
information is revealed to the public when patented. See 69 C.J.S. Patents § 1
(1951).
230 Gillman, 114 F.2d at 31; see also A. Schrader's Sons, Inc. v. Wein Sales Corp.,
9 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1925) (positing that use may still be secret even if two indi-
viduals have access to and knowledge of such use). The number of people who have
access to the invention and whether they have sworn to secrecy are relevant factors
in determining whether an invention has been sufficiently quarantined from the
outside world to constitute a "secret use." Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. H. Griffin & Sons
Co., 29 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1928), overruled on other grounds by Metallizing Eng'g
Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946).
2' Metallizing Eng'g, 153 F.2d at 520; see also Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.,
442 F.2d 216, 224 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971). "'Public use or sale' may be found even though
the inventor has contracted for secrecy by a user or, for that matter, has practiced
the invention solely for his own purposes." Id. The reasoning underlying this prin-
ciple was initially explained in Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the
public the secrets of his invention; if he should for a long period of years re-
tain the monopoly, and make, and sell his invention publicly, and thus
gather the whole profits of it, relying upon his superior skill and knowledge
of the structure; and then, and then only, when the danger of competition
should force him to secure the exclusive right, he should be allowed to take
out a patent, and thus exclude the public from any farther use than what
should be derived under it during his fourteen years; it would materially
retard the progress of science and the useful arts, and give a premium to
those who should be least prompt to communicate their discoveries.
Id. at 19.
22 Prior Domestic Commercial Use Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2235 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 104th Cong. 47 (1995) (statement of Prof. Richard Schwaab). "Overruling
Learned Hand's doctrine will not do the trick, and indeed may be too radical a solu-
tion at this time." Id.
' Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that
resolving issue of whether use of machine was public or secret is unnecessary be-
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The public use of an invention is not dispositive with regard
to § 102(g). Perhaps this is why certain industries, including the
software industry, seek prior user rights to avoid the conflicting
consequences of commercialization. For example, public use of
the invention, even without disclosing its details to the public, is
deemed sufficient to negate abandonment, suppression, or con-
cealment." In addition, the pursuit of a patent application may
provide evidence that the inventor was not abandoning an in-
vention under § 102(g).2 35
There are several instances where, after the conception of an
innovative concept, an inventor will not reveal her activity to the
public in a timely fashion. Certainly, there are numerous ex-
amples where an inventor conceals an invention in order to gain
a distinct advantage. Yet, other circumstances exist where an
inventor may cease development of one invention in order to
pursue other projects, only to later renew the prior effort. The
realities of inventive activity pose a self-defeating threat under
the current patent laws.
There is a vast difference between deliberate concealment
and negligence. Over one-hundred years ago, the Supreme
Court, in Kendall v. Winsor,u6 held that the "progress of science
and the useful arts" is frustrated by those inventors who
"designedly, and with the view of applying it indefinitely and
exclusively for his own profit, withholds his invention from the
public.""7 However, there is a stark contrast between withhold-
ing knowledge of an invention from the public and profiting from
the use of its inventive fruits through commercialization. Never-
cause even if use was secret, its commercial character rendered it public use).
2" Del Mar Eng'g Labs v. United States, 524 F.2d 1178, 1185 (Ct. Cl. 1975);
Dunlop Holdings Ltd. v. Ram Golf Corp., 524 F.2d 33, 37 (7th Cir. 1975). Three jus-
tifications are given for finding that public use negates abandonment, suppression,
or concealment. First, the public receives the benefit of the invention, therefore, no
suppression has occurred in any economic sense. Second, since the invention is ac-
cessible to the public, it is likely that a competitor will uncover the secret before the
time a patent would have expired if the inventor had applied in a timely fashion.
Third, an inventor has no duty to apply for a patent and may choose to risk his en-
titlement to monopoly protection. This election should not hinder his right to con-
tinue to market the product of his invention. Dunlop, 524 F.2d at 37.
' Cosden Oil & Chem. Co. v. American Hoechst Corp., 543 F. Supp. 522, 537
(D. Del. 1982) (finding that abandonment of patent application does not necessarily
indicate intent to abandon invention); Jacquard Knitting Mach. Co. v. Ordinance
Gauge Co., 213 F.2d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 1954) (holding pursuance of application
showed intent not to abandon).
2' 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322 (1858).
27 Id. at 328.
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theless, an inventor today may jeopardize her patent rights in an
invention by simply withholding it from the public for "too long."
A majority of inventions are put to use before patents are is-
sued because the PTO processing time is considered "too long."
Industries are concerned with the pre-application use of inven-
tions because such use could negate patentability. 8 Practical
tensions also arise since pre-application industrial use can show
an inventions' limitations or weaknesses. 9 Therefore, creating
greater flexibility in the pre-application stage of inventive activ-
ity will foster benefits to the public through increased innova-
tion.
Another area where pre-application activities cause frustra-
tion for inventors relates to priority-who is the first inventor in
the eyes of the law. Judge Howard T. Markey, former Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, noted that flexibility in constru-
ing inventive activity in light of § 102(g) is equitable.' ° Prior
user rights are most equitable and useful in national legal sys-
tems that are "first-to-file" and thus do not present the United
States conflicts regarding priority. Yet, prior user rights benefit
American inventors and small firms who would inevitably face
extreme difficulties with the bureaucracy of the patent applica-
tion process.
This is true for those small entities who find it difficult, if
not impossible, to "participate" in a patent system where they
must otherwise compete with large firms possessing the re-
sources to flood the PTO." 1 Prior user rights, therefore, present
another potential benefit in limiting PTO activity. Such a limi-
tation will serve the public interest by conserving limited PTO
resources. In addition, it is in the public's interest to preempt all
non-novel, or otherwise meritless patent applications. Further,
it is in the public's interest to preempt "small-time" patents.
Critics of patent monopolies, particularly members of the
medical community who oppose medical procedure patents,
should take some comfort in this well-founded policy and begin
Sanders, supra note 75, at 70. Sanders notes that the United States patent
laws preclude patenting any invention that has been used commercially for a period
exceeding twelve months. Id. Thus, the inventions that are used prior to receipt of a
patent may "inadvertently be used too long and thereby be disqualified." Id.
'9 Id.





to reap the benefits of prior user rights. Foremost among these
benefits is the minimization of the risk of a lawsuit. Moreover,
the health care establishment benefits if it is unfettered by the
current proprietary restraints. This enables enhanced use of an
invention, and, in turn, therapeutic treatment will follow. The
public benefits from more discoveries, more inventions, and more
applications put to use. The workload and bureaucracy of the
PTO is certain to decrease since patent applications are discour-
aged as the need for defensive patents decreases. The enhanced
inventive activity advances the rate of innovation, stimulating
new inventions of higher quality. As older inventions become
outmoded, the technology is freed and more readily available to
the public.
R. Carl Moy, associate professor of law at William Mitchell
College, is highly critical of those advocates who seek broad prior
user rights in order to secure enhanced trade secret protection. 2
Trade secret holders are acknowledged for conferring a benefit to
society through the production of new products-the fruits of
their innovation. Their motivation, however, is not considered
"philanthropic."' Since pursuing the patent or trade secret
route is a strategic choice for the inventor, the benefits of prior
user rights would definitely enhance the role of trade secrecy in
industry. Moy contends that any secrecy strategy is a pricing
decision2 related to an inventor's expectation of increased profit
according to the "single-source" monopolistic control over pat-
ented inventions.245
Objections to enacting broad prior user rights appear
grounded in the potential frustration with major federal policy
objectives. First, the measure appears to hinder the policy of
free competition. Second, the measure also appears to frustrate
the traditional bargain bestowing a limited monopoly in ex-
change for benefits to the public. The current system is defended
as maximizing the policies of free competition and public disclo-
sure.
Prior User, supra note 190, at 91 (statement of R. Carl Moy).
Id. Moy asserts that trade secret holders effectuate the following: (a) set a
price on their products that reflects the fact that they hold a monopoly on the tech-
nical innovation; (b) try to take advantage of this benefit for an indefinite period
whereas a patent holder can only do so for a limited time and; (c) at the same time,
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On these grounds, the objections may be squarely addressed.
Prior user rights preserve the traditional objectives of United
States intellectual property law. Moreover, they advance an-
other important value, certainty, as it pertains to legal, inven-
tive, and economic activity. Prior user rights add certainty of re-
turn on investment during the inventive process for the user. As
will be discussed in the next section, uncertainty-the enemy of
inventive activity-is minimized through prior user rights.
The benefits of prior user rights, beyond the advantage of
certainty, are highlighted when other policy objections are de-
fused. Any objection as to whether this policy hampers free
competition hinges on whether the enhanced trade secret pro-
tection arising under prior user rights frustrates federal policy
objectives. There is an apparent tension between the traditional
term for patent and trade secret protection.
While the patentee becomes a "single-source" monopolist for
a limited period, the trade secret holder or prior user can only
accomplish this for an uncertain period. It is worth emphasizing
that it is an uncertain or indefinite period. Unfortunately, some
wrongly equate these terms with "infinite." Recall that trade se-
cret protection, contrary to popular opinion, is not long-lived." 6
In addition, since both inventors have economic rights in an in-
vention, the price of the technology will approach the societal
optimum. Prior user rights advance uniform free competition
policies as technologies become more competitive.7"
Prior user rights bolster current trade secret policies. They
do more than promote trade secret rights; they change the fun-
damental nature of the bargain underlying the commercializa-
tion strategy. Consider the following: under current United
States patent practices, an inventor receives a limited monopoly
for her benefit to the public, which includes commercialization
and public disclosure via an issued patent. This limited monop-
oly encompasses certain traditional exclusive rights, including
the ability to transfer or license the technology. The current
patent application process also poses certain risks, such as delay-
ing the head start to commercialization, as well as the costs (e.g.,
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
2" Gary L. Griswold & F. Andrew Ubel, Prior User Rights -A Necessary Part of
a First-To-File System, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 567, 577 (1993) (stating that prior
user rights enhance global competitiveness and equalize patent rights world-wide
through creation of more uniform patent system).
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government and attorney's fees) and burdens related to the pat-
ent process.
Trade secret protection, by contrast, bears many risks de-
spite its superficial appeal. It does not yield prompt disclosure
and insecurely guards against inventive risk since a later pat-
entee can trump all of the trade secret holder's rights. Current
patent law is a "winner takes all" scenario that can lead to se-
vere economic dislocations.m
Prior user rights provide another, similar secondary bargain
between an inventor and the public balancing the rights in a
technology and its commercialization. A worthwhile contribution
should be rewarded consistent with the aforementioned theories
of property law. In exchange for the commercialization of a new
innovation which promptly benefits the public, the first inventor
who is a prior user obtains a more narrowly tailored monopoly in
return for that commercial activity. Additionally, the inventor
obtains a head start to the market and enjoys economic efficiency
by saving the costs involved in the patent system. As a corre-
sponding downside, the inventor does not win the traditional
patent rights afforded by forfeiting the patent route. (In truth,
these rights may never have been a relevant concern for the in-
ventor). This is a not a sacrifice for the inventor, but a conse-
quence of making the strategic decision of not abiding by the
traditional patent system quid pro quo.
There are several key differences among the rights belonging
to the traditional patentee and the prior user of a technology. A
patentee has the ability to license or transfer the technology; a
prior user does not.249 The patentee gains this valuable privilege
and the right to dispose and transfer an invention in return for
the public disclosure; a prior user does not."° Further, she has
the right to exclude others from making, using, and selling the
invention, important traditional rights belonging solely to the
patentee."' Thus, the prior user may have whatever limited eco-
nomic rights and market power she possesses trumped by a sec-
ond comer who becomes a patentee, who can exercise numerous
rights in the invention.
24 See Ubel, supra note 183, at 407 (discussing some negative effects of winner-
takes-all system including invalidation of otherwise valid patents).
20 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
2'0 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-113 (1994).
25' 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994).
19971
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
All factors combined, the prior user defense enhances the
traditional societal-inventor bargain under the current patent
system. Society benefits from the speedier access to the technol-
ogy, even though there may be a delayed or less forthcoming
disclosure in a short term time-frame. It is equitable and consis-
tent with our principles since a first inventor, through innova-
tion and the commercial use of the process, merits special legal
protection in return for bestowing upon the public the benefit of
new products and industrial efficiencies through commercializa-
tion. 2
Just as patents and trade secrets dovetail, prior user rights
help reach the aforementioned important federal policy objec-
tives and property theories. While there is an apparent tension
between patents and trade secrets, in Kewanee Oil, the Supreme
Court concluded that abolishing trade secret protection would
not increase the disclosure of discoveries of nonpatentable sub-
ject matter."a Hence, it is necessary to consider the concerns of
critics such as Moy regarding the impact of prior user rights on
our current system that disfavors trade secrets.
Since critics argue that any prior user rights legislation
should be modified to protect trade secrets in a narrowly tailored
way, it is worth noting the changes in the congressional propos-
als subsequent to Moy's 1994 testimony. The prior user rights
bill in the 104th Congress heeded these warnings and contained
several significant limitations over the bill introduced in the
103rd Congress. Under the revised legislation, the prior user de-
fense cannot be asserted unless the commercial activity is com-
menced more than one year prior to the patentee's application
2'2 Dunlop Holdings Ltd. v. Ram Golf Corp., 524 F.2d 33, 37 (7th Cir. 1975) ("If
the new idea is permitted to have its impact in the marketplace, and thus to
'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,' it surely has not been suppressed
in the economic sense."). To be entitled to a patent, the applicant must be the origi-
nal and first inventor of the invention claimed. See Radio Corp. of America v. Radio
Eng'g Lab. Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 3 (1934) ("The prize of an exclusive patent falls to one
who had the fortune to be [the] first [inventorJ."); City of Milwaukee v. Activated
Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 587 (7th Cir. 1934) (noting plaintiffs correct assertion of
law that only actual inventor is entitled to patent).
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974). The Court based
its conclusions on the fact that a patent cannot be granted for an invention unless it
falls within one of the statutory categories of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. Whether or not
trade secret protection exists, the inventor whose invention falls outside a § 101
category has no reason to apply for a patent. Id.
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date.' Of course, the most important safeguard of any prior
user rights measure is strictly freezing the scope and volume of
user's rights in accord with the actual commercial use before the
patent's filing date."5
Without these limitations, prior user rights may prove to be
as troublesome as the proverbial "submarine patent," by protect-
ing an invention that lies in wait only to arise unexpectedly and
cause severe economic dislocations and create uncertainty for the
subsequent innovator. Unlike pure trade secret law, this tem-
pering of the prior user defense balances the equities. Experts
note that prior user rights are a practical convenience, only used
for minor or unimportant process inventions. Tempered prior
user rights provide an enhanced incentive to patent. This would
certainly continue to drive important innovations into the public
sphere, and benefit the public by disclosure through the tradi-
tional patent system of publication.
Finally, there is one last certain conclusion. The prior user
defense serves as both a shield and a sword. Since it works both
ways, it proves a mixed blessing depending on the perspective of
a firm."6 Consider the possible perspective of a small inventor
who specializes in licensing new industrial developments. It
would be worrisome to have a very large corporation assert the
rights against a small-time inventor. A small American firm, by
contrast, would benefit from the privilege. Such a firm would be
shielded from licensing or being enjoined against an innovation
it had previously developed and put to use. This is a right widely
enjoyed by its overseas counterparts. Thus, one clear benefit for
firms of all sizes is that prior user rights are a useful hedge
against inventive risk, especially for those inventions of uncer-
tain or costly patentability. 7 The challenge of developing a ju-
dicious prior user rights policy to best balance the equities be-
H.R. 2235, 104th cong., 35 U.S.C. § 273(c)(6) (1995). In addition, the bill lim-
its the right to transfer the invention, id. § 273(b)(2), contains a high threshold for
its application, id. at § 273(c), places the burden of proof on the person asserting the
defense, id. § 273(c)(3), and provides for attorney's fees in certain cases where the
defense is unsuccessfully asserted. Id. § 273(d).
By contrast, proposed § 273(c)(1) of H.R. 2235 extends prior user rights to
"variations in the quantity or volume of use of the claimed subject matter." Id.
2 Prior User, supra note 190, at 121 (testimony of Arnold L. Newman, Presi-
dent, Synexus Corp.).
27 Id. at 45 (statement of Prof. Robert P. Merges). For example, prior use could
serve as a defense to patent infringement liability in a case where a company had
made commercial use of an "old" technique which had been patented. Id. at 37-38.
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tween patents and trade secrets requires understanding the fun-
damental theories regarding risk, secrecy, and monopoly power
as they apply to intellectual property.
VII. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: HEDGING RISK AND GUARDING
INCENTIVE
"All enlightened governments reward the inventer [sic] ...
Such results not only enrich a nation, but render it illustrious."
A full appreciation of the government's promotion of prog-
ress in the sciences and arts, including the biomedical disci-
plines, requires examining the economic underpinnings of pat-
ents and trade secrets. Ideally, it would be enough to
acknowledge an inventor's contribution to the public storehouse
of knowledge with an acknowledgment or title. In practice, com-
pensating physicians and corporate investors to undertake re-
search may be accomplished in many ways. It is believed that
physicians are guided by an ethical duty, coupled with standard
professional benefits. Traditionally, mere recognition and career
opportunities available to innovators were satisfactory motiva-
tion.259 Generally, this is the case with famous medical proce-
dures (e.g., the Heimlich maneuver).
Two policies drive patent law-individual reward and public
benefit. The former drives the latter, thus rewarding inventors
is simply a means to an end. For one model economic system,
scholars posit, "the reward for invention would be completely
separated from any charge to the users of the information.""'
Another theory advances the notion that the most efficient allo-
cation of resources in a society occurs by awarding the patentee a
lump sum in exchange for the unfettered dissemination of the in-
formation.261 However, critics are quick to acknowledge the
2' Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 692 (1846).
29 See Kelman Hearings, supra note 18, at 11. "Most people who are not famil-
iar with the patent system are astonished to learn that someone can 'own' a particu-
lar way of moving a scalpel for a surgical incision [or] a specific method of reading
and interpreting an ultrasound image ..... Id. at 2. Many assert that in some cases,
the same physicians who could profit from such patents are denouncing them. See
Noonan Hearings, supra note 111 at 5.
260 Arrow, supra note 197, at 617. Arrow notes that this separation existed in
the former U.S.S.R. Id. at 617 n.5. Arrow contrasts his model with a free enterprise
system by asserting that in such an economy, the need to make an invention profit-
able causes a non-optimal allocation of resources. Id. at 617.
261 MANSFIELD, supra note 86, at 208 n.7. For example, Alexander Hamilton
suggested that the United States government should award lump sum amounts for
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practical difficulties of such a bargain.262 To ensure scientific and
artistic results are in accord with constitutional goals, there
should be a certain level of creative investment within our soci-
ety, and economic theory helps guide society as to the appropri-
ate investment levels. This premise of creative investment holds
true for both the toy business and biomedical technology.
All types of research and development require certain safe-
guards to protect investments. Among the necessary safeguards,
economists recognize special "protecting devices" including pat-
ents, trade secrets, and previously secured long-period contracts
to minimize the risk and uncertainty of investments. 63
The cost of transmitting information concerning a particular
invention is very low.2" This will surely remain true as commu-
nication facilities increase due to the inception of new media
such as the Internet, and its associated cost decreases. There-
fore, since the information regarding an invention can be dis-
tributed at virtually no cost, any other source of the information,
such as reproduction, can easily negate the first inventor's mo-
nopoly.2
6 5
Economist Joseph Schumpeter is one of the principal schol-
ars who argues that economic investment in technological
change can be measured by waves of innovation followed by sub-
sequent waves of imitationY.2 6  His economic model suggests that,
repeatedly, one industry may inspire an invention, another one
manufacture it, and yet a third one use it. 267 Economics plainly
important inventions. Id. at 210 n.13.
2 Id. at 208 n.7. The practical difficulties of such a system include selecting
which inventions should be awarded patents and the appropriate amount of the
lump sum. Id. at 210 n.13, 211.
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOcIALIsM, AND DEMOCRACY 88 (3d
ed. 1950). These protecting devices are recognized as "normal elements of rational
management" by most economists. Id. Such devices are necessary to ensure entre-
preneurial actions against "hedging." Id.
204 Arrow, supra note 197, at 614. In addition, migration of employees from one
firm to another is an additional means by which information regarding an invention
is transmitted. Id. at 615.
20 Id. This necessitates the need for legal protection of inventions. Id. Other-
wise the true monopoly would be the use of the discovery by the inventor alone. Id.
This would be of little benefit to either the inventor or society. Id.
211 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 263, at 83 (discussing different views of eco-
nomic and technological change); see also Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1038-40
(discussing Schumpeterian theory in general).
267 SCHUMPETER, supra note 263, at 81-86. Schumpeter's model contends that
monopolies foster innovation which, in turn, causes revolutionary changes in the
economic system through a process he terms "creative destruction." Eisenberg, su-
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depicts that "copycats" make invention and authorship a risky
business.
The inherent high risk in initiating an investment increases
the likelihood of underinvestment in inventions .2  Underin-
vestment in medical inventions, however, poses serious risks for
the public health. Generally, the decision of how much to invest
is a function of the firm's risk preference and its ability to esti-
mate the probability of the invention's success. 269 Economists list
several factors which prospective inventors may use to gauge un-
certainty:
(1) the nature of the payoff function;
(2) the degree to which the information is available or outside
their control or knowledge; and
(3) the ability to reduce relevant uncertainties.2
The final inquiry into the uncertainty problem is the extent to
which a decision-maker can keep the set of possible alternatives
open, and thus not commit in any way, until more information
regarding the consequences of any choice it makes is received." I
pra note 64, at 1038-39. Schumpeter states that this process "incessantly revolution-
izes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, inces-
santly creating a new one." SCHUMPETER, supra note 263, at 83. In this process, old
firms providing obsolete goods and services are driven out by new firms creating
new innovations. Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1039.
26 Id. at 1025. "Since it is a risky process, there is bound to be some discrimina-
tion against investment in inventive and research activities." Arrow, supra note 197,
at 616. Inventions with potentially large social benefits might, therefore, never come
about unless private returns for invention were increased above their free market
values. Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1025. Arrow also suggests that because there
does not exist an adequate market to shift risk, the fear of risks will lead to under-
investment. Arrow, supra note 197, at 611-14. But see John S. McGee, Patent Ex-
ploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems, 9 J.L. & ECON. 135, 136 (1966)
(asserting that risk in some cases may produce over-investment in invention).
26 Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1025 n.33. Some scholars suggest that people
who enjoy risk will tend to "overinvest in inventive activity." Id. It has been noted,
however, that there are many different models of decision theory. Richard R. Nel-
son, The Link Between Science and Invention: the Case of the Transistor, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 551
n.7 (1962).
2'o Id. at 550-51. Included in the ability to reduce the uncertainties factor is the
ability to learn. Id. at 551.
2" Id. In the case of Bell Telephone Laboratories' semiconductor research, due
to uncertainty regarding the feasibility of the project, rather than commit to a spe-
cific goal, researchers focused instead on learning in general. Id. at 566. The com-
pany conducted extensive research to learn about the best types of conductors in or-
der to limit the chance of error in the future and increase the chance of certainty
regarding the product. Id.
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The ability to promote the public health is embodied in these
choices.
Several methods are available to firms to overcome the risks
and uncertainties present in inventive investments. In theory, a
firm can self-insure against losses attributable to the inventive
process." Theory also dictates that, when a device is available
that can insure against loss, it has the positive effect of increas-
ing investment to a level closer to the societal optimum."' In
addition, investment in new inventions may also be secured by
entering a market with a "head start" advantage, as may often
be secured by secrecy.274 Accordingly, Arrow posits that, if indi-
viduals can avoid risk and there is no available "insurance"
mechanism, then there is less spent than is socially desirable on
risky activities such as inventing.275
Patents are desirable protective devices because they pos-
sess relative certainty in the duration of their protective terms.
Today, the term of patent protection is approximately 17 years,
depending on PTO pendency."6 Yet, even a relatively short du-
ration period for a "protecting device" is more desirable than
none at all. Overall, many new goods and services are intro-
duced to markets in experimental or unsatisfactory forms; such
products have a limited chance of success among consumers."'
2 See Arrow, supra note 197, at 616 (discussing fact that invention is risky and
needs protection). A company can self-insure against inventive losses by keeping
research projects relatively small. Arrow asserts, however, that this would weaken
the incentive to succeed. Id. Arrow also states that moral factors will affect what
type of risk insurance or risk-bearing companies will decide to use. Id.
273 Id. at 612. To attain the societal optimum, insurance would have to cover
every perceivable event. Unfortunately, the shifting of risks is incomplete. Id. In-
surance covers only a small range of events. Id. Securities are more important in
shifting risks and are, therefore, used more frequently. Id.
2,4 Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1026 (citing FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
ARKET STRuCTuRE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 384-87 (1970)). This "headstart"
advantage "may provide a sufficient incentive to promote investment in research."
Id.
2,; 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994) (stating that patents are granted for term beginning
on date of issuance and ending 20 years from date on which patent application was
filed). This law grants assignees the right to exclude others from "using, offering for
sale or selling [the product] throughout the United States." Id.
,2' This is based on the current operation of law under GATT which provides for
twenty-years of protection less PTO processing time. See supra note 71.
2n SCHUMPETER, supra note 263, at 92. The introduction of unsatisfactory and
experimental forms of innovation into the market facilitates the improvement of the
quality of products. Id.
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The level of successful investment should be rationally17 re-
lated to the level of profitability.279 According to the world's vari-
ous patent systems, patents must be periodically renewed
through some action or payment by the patentee, otherwise the
patent expires.280 This helps to decrease the amount of "bad pat-
ents" that exist,"' a benefit acknowledged around the world.M
These weeding practices create little financial incentive for in-
ventors to pay money to renew unprofitable patents and, there-
fore, technology is freed.21 In the United States system, the pat-
ent process is considered overly litigious.' Preserving patents
may, however, have a defensive value, as they may protect
against claims of infringement of related or overlapping technol-
ogy. If patent protection is unavailable as a legal means to re-
coup investment, other protective means must be secured to jus-
tify investment.285
Patents also play an important role in setting an affordable
level of prices for new inventions.286 This is a prime concern for
proponents of a moratorium on medical procedure patents.
Schumpeter is among those economists who note that, in a capi-
talist system which lacks the "protecting devices" of intellectual
property protection, one alternative method for guarding an in-
278 As used here and in economic terms, "rational" is defined as cost reduction
oriented.
279 See MANSFIELD, supra note 86, at 207-08 n.5 (discussing profitability of vari-
ous patents). Sanders' study of inventions found that two-thirds of inventions in
past use were profitable and, one-third reported a loss. Id. For inventions in current
use, nine-tenths were profitable and one tenth were a loss. Id. (citing Barkev S.
Sanders, Patterns of Commercial Exploitation of Patented Inventions by Large and
Small Companies, 8 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. OF RES. & EDUC. 52 (1964).
28 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 155, 156 (1994) (discussing procedures necessary
to obtain patents and patent term extension procedures).
281 See MANSFIELD, supra note 86, at 210 (discussing need to "weed out worth-
less patents").
282 Id. Some countries have implemented annual fee requirements by patentees
to assist in weeding out these "bad" patents. Id.
' Id. Another means of "weeding out" is a system of general compulsory licens-
ing in which anyone can obtain licenses under any patent, therefore, decreasing the
hope of obtaining attractive monopoly royalties. Id.
See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 131-146 (discussing examination of patent appli-
cation and appeals process at all levels).
285 SCHUMPETER, supra note 263, at 88. These other protective means may in-
clude additional investment or a price policy that encourages the ability to write-off
expenses. Id.
2' See, e.g., Laura Johannes, Serono Wins Approval for AIDS Drug, WALL. ST.
J., Aug. 27, 1996, at B4 (explaining how pressure from public interest groups forced
company to cap price of new growth hormone drug).
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vestment is a price policy that recoups costs more quickly than
other policies. Economic theory does not support the political
rhetoric which alleges that patents create a burdensome or costly
impact on patients or consumers.
Economic theory dictates that, without patents, new medical
and surgical innovations would be able to enter the marketplace
only at very high prices. These prices would then remain at such
levels until information regarding the invention is disseminated
and competition among various providers eventually drives them
down. Disclosure of the innovation28 7 would quickly disseminate
throughout the market without any financial or psychological re-
turn to the original developers. Consequently, this lack of
benefit for these investors would lead to limited patient access to
new discoveries as people would be reluctant to invent. Since in-
tellectual property is a protective device establishing a mecha-
nism to distribute costs over a period of time, the public benefits
when patents maintain relatively low and steady medical prices
while allowing for the possibility of new discoveries.
The Framers envisioned a system where the government
provided incentives and means for the private sector to pay for
scientific and technological progress, rather than direct subsidi-
zation."8 In fulfilling this goal, patents allow for the creation
and preservation of various firms. The entire intellectual prop-
erty system's purpose is economic; it is simply an investment tool
used to facilitate commerce by permitting patentees to obtain fi-
nancing and stock equity."
Today, biotechnology and medical firms fund their research
from equity capital, not product sales.29 Patents are funding
2 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 263, at 83. Innovation refers to the develop-
ment of new consumer goods, new methods of production, new markets and new
forms of industrial organization. Id. Schumpeter asserts that these are "Itlhe fim-
damental impulses that set and keep the capitalist engine in motion." Id.
2' Burch, supra note 6, at 1166. It has been asserted that denying medical proc-
ess patents would dilute the constitutional policy favoring private sector financing
for innovations. Id. at 1166 n.135. Burch states that this cost should be considered
within an ethical analysis when determining whether to finance innovations and to
create medical process patents. Id.
29 See Prior User, supra note 190, at 8 (testimony of Bruce Lehman, PTO
Comm'r); see also Medical Hearings, supra note 13, at 1995 WL 618644, at *2
(testimony of Dr. Frank Baldino, Jr., President & CEO, Cephalon, Inc.).
2" Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act: Hearings on H.R. 1127
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 4 (Oct. 19, 1995) (testimony of Dr. Frank Baldino, Jr., President & CEO
Cephalon, Inc.). Since 1991, Dr. Baldino's company, Cephalon, Inc., has raised over
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mechanisms that put assets on a firm's balance sheet. If patents
are not enforceable, however, they become both meaningless and
economically worthless. Firms would be unable to attract the
capital needed to offset inventive risk without them. Today, this
inventive risk is distributed throughout the market by investors
willing to risk their capital and buy stock in these biomedical
fis. 291 Observers note that the cost of medical research is in-
creasing at a "time when noncommercial sources of [medical]
funding are decreasing."29 2 Increased risk would cause the rate
of invention to plummet.
Economists also suggest that an efficiency exists in the in-
terplay between a patentee and society, where the patentee can
merely extract a price consistent with the utility consumers de-
rive from the invention. The economics of this exchange guaran-
tee that a patentee cannot charge more for the patent's use than
its societal utility, since consumers will not pay more than the
invention is worth.293 It is argued, however, that since individu-
als will always place a very high premium on their health and
will be willing to pay for it, medicinal costs will remain high.
Beyond pricing concerns, the importance of a healthy society re-
quires the promotion of better technology.
Medical and surgical innovation pose different challenges to
setting a commodity's price. First, government involvement in
the public health system is already present.294 State govern-
$250 million in equity capital. This reflects the fact that most biotechnology compa-
nies are not in a position to borrow capital. Id. The principal capital source for re-
search support is, in fact, equity financing. Id.
29 Id. "There is substantial risk and expense associated with biotechnology re-
search and investors need to know that the inventions of our companies cannot be
pirated by our competitors." Id. Baldino further states that investors will be reluc-
tant to provide capital to fund research if there is inadequate protection of inven-
tions, and such capital is imperative to inventing. Id.
= Burch, supra note 6, at 1143. "If the relationship between the availability of
patents and research funds can be inferred from these facts, then a flat rejection of
medical process patents creates at least some element of paradox." Id.
293 Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1026 n.34. As such, patents permit inventors to
use their monopoly positions to obtain "a price that more closely approaches the
value that users receive from inventions." Id. at 1026. Society benefits from the so-
cial value of the inventions. Id. But see William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Ex-
ploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 270
(1966). "The argument is unsound because it fails to take into account indirect costs
not borne by the inventor that the monopoly device imposes on society. These costs
diminish the net social value of the invention and upset the private value-social
value equation." Id.
29' See Johannes, supra note 286, at B4 (stating that government approval proc-
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ments are highly involved with physician licensing and the fed-
eral government safeguards the general public from very ex-
perimental and innovative medical inventions through a strin-
gent quality and safety assurance process (e.g., the FDA).295
Second, patents are already tempered by the existence of many
exceptions for parties, including competitors, to use patented
technology or inventions in their research and experimenta-
tion."'8 These factors tend to drive up the price of medicine as a
result of the unavoidable delay and inevitable loss of market
share. Eliminating the government's inability to enforce certain
medical patents undoubtedly decreases their value and has se-
vere negative implications for firms and consumers in the health
care marketplace.
VIII. SECRECY
A moratorium on any patent or corresponding right will de-
crease communication of technical information, foreclosing an
important alternative means of publication. Inevitably, there
will be a rise in hidden uses and trade secret protection of proc-
esses among doctors. The enactment of prior user rights that
this paper advocates, however, also leads to increased secrecy.
A critical inquiry is whether the inevitable consequence of a
rise in secrecy in either case frustrates the country's goal of pro-
gress in the arts and sciences is beneficial. Specifically, the con-
sequences of the rise of secrecy in medicine must be mindfully
considered. Any analysis must weigh some of the popular myths
concerning secrecy against the facts existing regarding science.
There is a popular belief that secrecy is something negative.
Scholars have cautioned that the intense secrecy of the medieval
guild system "retarded technological progress and economic
growth."297 During the House's hearings on H.R. 1127, one Con-
ess delays availability of drug to AIDS patients).
2- See id. (discussing FDA's safety procedures for gaining approval); see also Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1760, 1760 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(discussing fact that new drug must receive FDA approval); People v. Mari, 183 N.E.
858,859 (N.Y. 1933) (discussing criteria for licensed physicians in New York).
" See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1996). "It shall not be an act of
infringement ... for uses reasonably related to the [federally regulated compound]
development." Id.; see also Eli Lilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 669-74 (1990) (holding that
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provides for medical devices, as well as compounds).
25-ANSFIELD, supra note 86, at 208. "Secrecy makes it difficult for inventors to
sell or license their inventions to others because it is difficult to persuade someone
to pay for an idea without disclosing it, yet once the invention is disclosed, the in-
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gressman even questioned whether there would be a rise in se-
cretive medical clinics as a result of patents."8 History also
denigrates the secrecy of Robert Koch, who discovered the tu-
bercle bacillus and attempted to cure the disease by tuberculin
inoculation; he is called "conceited, intolerant, [and] quackish."299
Today, the medical profession is portrayed as cooperative
and teamwork oriented."' Further, it is viewed as a collegial
system, featuring open communication, the sharing of ideas, and
intellectual honesty; doctors are thought to be teachers and
sharers.31' The good of the patient is the primary focus.' °2
Hence, any changes in our system promising new modes of medi-
cal treatment at affordable prices, should first promote the best
for patient care.
Despite the negative views of secrecy, there exists a benefi-
cial role for trade secrecy in protecting inventive investment and
warding off risk. Beyond the industrial sphere, proponents of
prior user rights and the enhanced secrecy protection argue that
secrecy impacts minimally upon research and development.3
Some scholars agree that secrecy has a positive value for the ad-
vancement of science; it serves as a protective device against the
theft of ideas, avoiding disputes over priority, and acknowledging
the worthiness of research.3°
ventor has nothing left to sell." Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1029.
See Medical Hearings, supra note 13, at 1995 WL 11096027, at *1 (testimony
of Greg Ganske) (noting that patent protections for surgical methods work against
medical progress).
" McTavish, supra note 106, at 348.
" Medical Hearings, supra note 13, at 1995 WL 11095852, at *3 (testimony of
G. Lee Skillington) ("Because of the tradition in the medical community to freely
share knowledge and skills, the inducements offered by the patent system are per-
haps not as urgent in [the medical] field as in others.").
... See Hoskins Hearings, supra note 151, at 6 (noting that "in the practice of
medicine and surgery, publication and teaching of innovations is the norm, a much
encouraged pattern of behavior"). Dr. Hoskins asserts that the medical community
does not have the incentive of monopolies which benefits the public. Id. The medical
community has never needed monopoly profits to encourage invention. Id.
302 See generally 61 AM. JUR. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers §§
166-167 (1981).
303 Prior User, supra note 190, at 41 (testimony of Robert P. Merges) (citing Lise
Osterborg, Towards a Harmonized Prior User Right Within a Common Market Pat-
ent System, 12 INTL REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 447, 461 (1981)). Mr. Merges
states that any objection to prior user rights as having a negative impact on re-
search and development, has been minimal in other countries. Id. Furthermore,
there has been no evidence of such negative impact. Id.
304 Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1062-63 (citing Ian I. Mitroff, The Subjective
Side of Science, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 579, 592-93 (1974)). Additionally, even when se-
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Secrecy in the early stages of scientific research promotes
individualism and independence among researchers."5 While
such values are important, they are at odds with the monitoring
and control of coordinated research. 6 Thus, proponents of indi-
vidualism and independence are critical of coordinated teamwork
in industrial research because it is likely to be scientifically
"arid."30 7
In the basic research sphere, secrecy translates into re-
searchers ensuring their professional recognition by safeguard-
ing their ideas and theories from misappropriation and protect-
ing the incentive to discover and invent. In the industrial
sphere, secrecy likewise ensures researchers freedom from use
by competitors of their proprietary data.
Secrecy is faulted for leading to organizational and discipli-
nary inefficiencies, imposing a net cost on the allocation of soci-
ety's resources, and increasing duplicative research."8 If secrecy
does lead to duplicative research, however, the result is not nec-
essarily harmful."9 With duplicative research, problems may be
solved more quickly and different inventions are more likely to
crecy leads to duplicative research, such research may still be valuable because
multiple, simultaneous research efforts tend to increase the likelihood that a prob-
lem will be resolved quickly and promotes the increase of knowledge. Eisenberg, su-
pra note 64, at 1063. Furthermore, the extra research increases the chances that
such research will eventually be made known to the scientific community. Id. at
1064. Independent discoveries help create greater validity for new research claims.
Id. Typically, duplicate researchers will use somewhat different approaches, make
different mistakes, and perhaps obtain different results. Id. at 1064. Therefore,
duplicate research is really not redundant, but helpful. Id.
'2" Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1063. Allowing secrecy may encourage research-
ers to develop new plans, conduct new studies, and keep their studies secret until
publishing them in exchange for recognition. Id. The author further acknowledges,
however, that these secrecy benefits are not widely touted. Id. This independence
argument is more sensible in cases where the course of the research cannot be
charted in advance and the effort's success therefore depends upon the investiga-
tion's creativity. Id. at 1067.
"" Id. at 1065.
307 Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1066. Individualism and independence promote
progress and individual initiative and creativity, which are impeded by coordination
of research. Id. The coordination theory is mainly concerned with efficiency while
the individualism and independence approach focuses on scientific progress as a
goal. Id. These differences are greatly disputed as reasons for adopting one over the
other. Critics of the independence scheme suggest it is wasteful in that it leads to
duplicative research, but others suggest that this so-called "waste" is actually pro-
ductive. Id. at 1063-64; see supra note 304 (countering argument that redundancy
leads to waste).
'~ Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1062-63.
's Id. at 1063.
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arise.31 The more researchers working on a problem or reaching
the same conclusions, the more likely it is that these efforts will
be incorporated into scientific knowledge. " ' Multiple research
teams investigating the same problem can also help to validate
particular research results.3 " Moreover, research duplication
among competing research teams is rarely entirely redundant."3
The use of different approaches, backgrounds, and techniques
promises beneficial results.1 It is also probable that multiple
investigators will draw different conclusions and recognize new
implications from the same discovery.1 '
Another highly beneficial research strategy is for inventors
to work in parallel. 16 This may be described as a hybrid strategy
coordinating independent groups. Parallel research leads to in-
creased innovation and greater alternative designs, raising the
odds of an increased storehouse of knowledge and allowing al-
ternate designs to be ranked by likelihood of success.317 The
benefits of the parallel research strategy include,
(1) increased returns corresponding to the number of alterna-
tives;
(2) a higher rate of "learning;"
(3) lower costs at the initial stages of the enterprise; and,
318(4) greater "differences" among the resulting solutions.
Unfortunately, too much of any good thing, including se-
30 Id. Coordination of such efforts would compromise researchers' independ-
ence, thereby reducing the efficiency of the effort. Id. at 1065; see supra note 287
(discussing positive effects of duplicate research).
3" Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1065; see also supra note 287.3 2 Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1064. "Multiple independent discoveries help
establish the validity of new research claims, serving as a substitute for after-the-
fact replication." Id.
31 Id. The prolific publication of scientific research results, even after publica-
tion by others, illustrates the value of overlapping research. Id. at 1064 n.204.
314 Id. at 1065 (stating that duplicate research serves valuable function).
315 Id.
31 See Richard R. Nelson, Introduction, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF IN-
VENTIVE ACTIVrTY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 3, 9-10 (1962) (noting that un-
certainty in research and development necessitates running several investigative
efforts in parallel).
317 Id. at 10 (stating that success of parallel research is intuitively reasonable
but difficult to prove).
3'8 Id. (noting positive implications of parallel efforts). The primary effect would
be an increase in the number of independent efforts to devise similar products or
reduce the costs of publication. Id.
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crecy, leads to diminishing economies of scale and bears negative
consequences. Therefore, a balancing of the equities must be
struck. Extreme and long-lived secrecy frustrates federal policy
objectives. Research and development must exist in concert with
fora for publication and public scrutiny.
In practice, a healthy dose of secrecy in basic research and
medicine, as well as commerce, is useful and has positive effects.
At the initial stages of research, secrecy serves as a protective
device by averting risk and ensuring an increase in the public's
storehouse of knowledge in the sciences and arts. Today, in the
field of biomedical research, the traditional dividing line between
the basic research of academic study, and applied research of in-
dustrial technology, is blurred.319 While important research dis-
coveries are increasingly likely to be patented, they also require
some type of enhanced secrecy protection from the onset. This
synergistic dovetail between patents and trade secrets enhances
the research environment and advances the federal policies for
innovation, free competition, and speedier public disclosure.
IX. MONOPOLIES AND MEDICINE
Any protective device, whether patents, secrecy, or con-
tracts, conveys market power and restricts competition."20 Con-
ditions breed the monopolistic result, and even in some limited
form, any protective device has some monopolistic32' effect."
39 Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1018; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary
Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 196
(1987) ("Academic and industrial researchers ... often work[] on the same or closely
related problems, whether competitively or collaboratively.").
320 See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400-01
(1956) (holding that exclusion, rather than restriction, creates monopoly power over
prices under Sherman Act); Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1341-
42 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that requisite economic power is presumed from copy-
right). Cf Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11 (1984)
(recognizing that, in context of exclusive contract, not every refusal to sell more
than one product restrains competition). "A common misconception has been that a
patent or copyright ... suffices to demonstrate market power.... [Ilt is also possible
that [such] a seller ... will have no market power: for example, a patent holder has
no market power ... if there are close substitutes for the patented product." Id. at 37
n.7 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARv. L. REV. 937 (1981)); Abbott Lab. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354-
55 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that no presumption of market power is established from
intellectual property right); Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc. v. Glaverbel, S_-_, 861
F. Supp. 653, 662-63 (N.D. IlM. 1994) (noting that mere possession of patent does not
create presumption of market power for antitrust inquiry).
"3' The word "monopoly" is derived from the Greek, meaning "alone to sell." 1
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Denouncing the monopolies arising from medical patents is a
staple in the political debate to influence public policy.
One of the main arguments against biomedical patents is
that they monopolize health care. The demagoguery of decrying
monopolies has a long tradition among conservatives, even dur-
ing times when monopolies were not problematic and markets
were perfectly competitive. 2 ' Proponents of the moratorium
claim that patents are powerful monopolies, hurting the nation's
health care system. Economic theory reveals the opposite. Many
inventors attest from experience that a patent is an extremely
weak monopoly."
Today, patents are referred to as "intellectual property"
rather than as a monopoly privilege. Economists trace this no-
menclature back to the nineteenth century where proponents of
the patent system engaged in a deliberate "political ruse." In or-
der to advance their cause, patent advocates used the label
"property" rather than "monopoly privilege" due to its positive
connotation.u
The negative connotation of monopolies is pervasive and still
serves as a powerful propaganda tool. This perception may exist
due to, or in spite of, the truth that monopolies are quite common
in day-to-day life. It is written that a monopolist is one "who
sells anything that is not in every respect, wrapping and location
ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-9.
322 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.2, n.9 (1995).
Market power can be exercised in other economic dimensions, such as
quality, service, and the development of new or improved goods and proc-
esses. It is assumed in this definition that all competitive dimensions are
held constant except the ones in which market power is being exercised;
that a seller is able to charge higher prices for a higher-quality product
does not alone indicate market power. The definition in the [DoJ-FTC] text
is stated in terms of a seller with market power. A buyer could also exer-
cise market power (e.g., by maintaining the price below the competitive
level, thereby depressing output).Id.
3 SCHUMPETER, supra note 263, at 100.
'2 MANSFIELD, supra note 86, at 208. "The patent [however] gives the inventor
the right to charge ... for the use of the information" or invention, reducing the
availability of knowledge below a level which is "socially optimal." Id.
3' Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth
Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 16-17 (1950) ("It happens that those who started using
the word property in connection with inventions had a very definite purpose in
mind: they wanted to substitute a word with a respectable connotation, 'property,'
for a word that had an unpleasant ring, 'privilege.' ").
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and service included, exactly like what other people sell."26
Hence, even the corner grocer in a small town, for example, may
be a monopolist for a certain product, at that location, even if
merely for a few hours a day.327
Aside from medical and surgical patents, the medical pro-
fession is not in perfect competition. Their numbers, for in-
stance, are limited by state licensing boards. Their ability and
talents range widely. A lone country doctor could be a monopo-
list.
Recently, the debate over the changing nature of the medical
marketplace has begun to broaden its focus from medical pat-
ents, specifically, to the larger array of monopolies, in general.
There is growing concern about the medical field being domi-
nated by mega-mergers resulting in merely a few large HMOs or
other entities controlling a region's health care. Dr. Noonan
suggests that the controversy regarding medical and surgical
patents is merely part of a larger debate concerning the transfer
of control of medicine to large corporate entities.3"
Some economists argue that there is an inherent conflict be-
tween large corporations and innovation. This reasoning lies in
the theory that the priority of business, to conserve capital, con-
flicts with new investment. Similarly, economist Joseph Schum-
peter argues that whenever a field is controlled by a few large
entities, they can and will fight the progress of innovation to
preserve their capital structure.329
Business studies provide mixed results as to the role of pat-
ents in encouraging research, development, and innovation.330
Studies reveal that large corporations patent fewer inventions
than smaller firms.33' The results apparently vary by industry,
:21 SCHUMIPETER, supra note 263, at 99.
-2 Id. at 102.
"2 Noonan, supra note 22, at 662. '[T]he existence of these mammoth for-profit
medical corporations calls into question the argument that medicine is an altruistic
calling that should somehow be treated differently by the patent law than any other
industrial endeavor." Id.
2 SCHUIPETER, supra note 263, at 96.
3" MANSFIELD, supra note 86, at 209 (noting that "[platents are much more im-
portant for independent inventors and small firms").
" Jacob Schmookler, Comment, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVrT: ECONOIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 78, 79-80 (1962). Data confirms that
during the middle of the Twentieth Century, corporate research and development
rose several-fold, but the number of patents over the same period only rose by
twenty percent. Id.
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with the electronic, chemical, and drug industries valuing patent
protection, while the auto, paper and rubber industries do not. 2
Patents are arguably more valuable to small entities and in-
dependent inventors, rather than large firms. Studies indicate
that, as a percentage, the number of patents awarded to indi-
viduals has steadily declined since the turn of the century while
the number of patents going to corporations during the same pe-
riod has increased.333 Another study reports that small firms use
a greater percentage of patents than do large firms.'
Empirical studies, however, are not entirely helpful in
measuring the effect of a large entity dominating a field and
precluding innovation. Experts explain that large firms are
more fit than smaller firms to carry out their inventions without
the protection of the patent system.35 There are many other im-
portant reasons why some large entities patent less, including,
(1) the sharp rise in the compulsory licensing of thousands of
corporate patents spurred by the United States' strong antitrust
policies; (2) conflicts among many judicial decisions concerning
corporate Research and Development ("R&D"); (3) changes in the
economics of the inventive process due to the government's in-
creased involvement in corporate R&D; (4) extensive adminis-
trative delays and costs in processing a patent application; and
(5) corporate strategies viewing a superior head start time to the
market as a sufficient protective device.336
On the other hand, monopolies clearly pose benefits that
332 See MANSFIELD, supra note 86, at 209 (noting that some firms find "patents
make little difference in their search for ... new products and processes").
The following chart shows the percentage of issued patents between indi-
viduals and companies.





Sanders, supra note 75, at 62.
The Sanders study of a random sample of patents granted found that for pat-
ents assigned as of the issue date, 51 percent were used by large companies; 71 per-
cent were used by small companies and; 49 percent of patents unassigned as of the
issue date were used commercially. MANSFIELD, supra note 86, at 207 n.5.
3" Id. at 209 ("[Platents are not really important as incentives to the large cor-
poration, since it cannot afford to fall behind in the technological race, regardless of
whether or not it receives a patent.").
"6 Schmookler, supra note 331, at 79-80 (noting that where corporate research




must also be recognized. There are scenarios where a monopoly
brings greater economies of scale, organizational efficiency, or a
superior combination of resources and talent. Thus, monopoly
prices are not necessarily higher, nor is output necessarily
smaller than in competitive markets.337
In evaluating firms with monopolies, an informed public
policy choice needs to measure both the societal benefits and
costs. While a large entity may dominate a given field, even a
sole independent inventor can exert significant market power
with a protective device such as a patent. A patentee can exert
quality control through a patent. The control that a patent en-
sures may also help to police prices in the market. Other pro-
tective devices may also ensure these results.
Despite allegations to the contrary, a moratorium or a re-
striction on infringement remedies risks economic hardships.
The popular belief is that a patentee of a new technique keeps
prices high.33 However, once a clinic or medical group estab-
lishes the price for a procedure, there is no guarantee that other
physicians who oppose these medical patents will philanthropi-
cally help bring down the cost of health care. While a patentee
may be able to affect a pricing level, recall that the Pallin patent
brought down the price of cataract surgery.
Physicians without competition within a geographic area
may infringe valid medical patents, disregard licensing terms,
and charge whatever price the market will bear, even up to and
beyond the patent holders instructed price. For the patent
holder, the price represents recouping the original investment.
For the "free rider," it represents pure profit. Hence, patents are
a legal device which allows for cost control and access to quality
health care in spite of their monopolistic attributes.
Most importantly, there are several reasons why the market
power of any physician's patent is limited. Foremost, a patent is
itself a limited monopoly. It is limited in many ways, most no-
tably the duration of its term. While a particular invention may
be excluded by the patentee, inevitably there are alternatives
waiting to be discovered and utilized.
The patent system fosters invention in spite of exclusive
37 SCHMPETER, supra note 263, at 101.
See Silvy A. Miller, Should Patenting of Surgical Procedures and Other
Medical Techniques by Physicians Be Banned?, 36 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 255, 267
(1996).
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rights.39 The incentive to "invent around" a valid patent and de-
velop functional substitutes is a policy embraced by the courts." °
It must also be emphasized that within the Nation's health care
system, the qualifications on medical patents are compounded
by state and other regulatory requirements for the medical pro-
fession.
A patent's exclusive rights are also tempered in several
other important ways, including, (1) the federal government's
exercise of eminent domain rights; (2) the vast antitrust laws;
and, (3) the ability of local governments to continue using
equipment and facilities purchased with public funds even when
patent infringement is found. 1
From a political perspective, the "monopoly problem" in
medicine, whether it be patents, the rise of HMOs, or the supply
of care givers regulated by the states, is an issue yet to be fully
explored by the government. It is important to emphasize that
the protective devices of patents, trade secrecy, and contracts are
limited by the Constitution, antitrust laws, and other regula-
tions. Ultimately, one may safely conclude that our health care
system encourages increased knowledge and a heightened qual-
ity of life, by sanctioning certain monopolistic protective devices
as well as their strict regulation."
39 "[Instances of any situations where somebody obtains a patent ... [giving]
them a real monopoly [are rare].... [A] patent ... stimulate[s] others to invent
around it, to improve upon it, to find a different way to do the same thing, and it
spurs competition rather than restricts competition." Patents and the Constitution:
Transgenic Animals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and
the Administration of Justice of the House of Representatives Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 100th Cong. (1988) [hereinafter Transgenic Hearings].
m See State Indus., Inc. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ("One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called 'negative incentive' to
'design around' a competitor's products, even when they are patented, thus bringing
a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace."); see also Yarway Corp. v. Eur-
Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 278 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that patent holder's
attempt to invent around its licensed patent did not justify enhancement of dam-
ages to licensee in licensee's patent infringement suit).
34' Rohrback, supra note 201, at 7-8. "Congress and the courts have heretofore
regarded patentee's exclusive rights as essentially sacrosanct and have permitted
their erosion, even to a very limited extent, only upon a clear showing of public in-
terest of the highest order, but not to protect a private, commercial investment." Id.
at 7.
= Griffith Rubber Mills v. Hoffar, 313 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1963). "Patents are is-
sued not for private benefit but for the public good; they grant a monopoly for a lim-
ited period as an incentive to the disclosure of innovations which in the end will add
to the fund of freely available knowledge." Id. (citing Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Inter-
chemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945)); see also Evr-Klean Seat Pad Co. v.
396 [Vol. 71:329
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X. HEALTH ECONOMICS AND PATENT REFORMS
Changes in the United States patent code must take into ac-
count the Nation's traditional major federal policy objectives: in-
novation, disclosure, competition, and uniformity. Any changes
must also seek to maximize certainty in the inventive and crea-
tive investment processes. Proponents of the moratorium on
medical patents or infringement remedies contend that patents
contribute to the Nation's health care costs. 3
The medical profession has abandoned its prior advocacy of
a moratorium on protection for medical devices and compounds.
Yet it now takes the more radical and contradictory position con-
cerning medical innovation. A patent moratorium on medical
processes will result in trade secrecy becoming the only available
method of protection. All of these practices imply monopolistic
pricing, limiting patient care, and other ethically troubling out-
comes.
Proponents of recent medical patent legislation search to
maintain their eroding autonomy and insulate themselves from
risk of lawsuits. While these motivations may be characterized
as either politically prudent or intellectually impure, intellectual
property policies and the Nation's health system may have been
indiscriminately and unwittingly thrown back over 150 years.
Unfortunately, the debate is filled with false claims that patents
silence the dissemination of knowledge. Yet invention is the an-
tecedent for disclosure. Severing the remedy from its corre-
sponding right inevitably ties the hands of an inventor and frus-
trates the innovation process. The public health consequently
suffers.
The health care system will be legally impacted by denying
credible patent protection to medical processes. Medical innova-
tion is hindered by insecure capital and heightened risk in the
inventive process. Additionally, competition in the medical mar-
ketplace is obstructed through a loss of firms and innovation.
Medical process patents could reduce costs as new simple proce-
dures replace expensive devices and compounds.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 118 F.2d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1941) ("The patent law was
not invented as a dam to divert natural changes and evolutionary progress in the
arts into the laterals of monopoly.").
m See Lara L. Douglass, Medical Process Patents: Can We Live Without Them?
Should We?, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 161, 178 (1995) ("[Tlhe increase in price resulting
from a monopoly is simply not as offensive in other industries as it is in the medical
field.").
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As an alternative to medical process patents, there will be a
rise in outright trade secret protection for procedures. Protec-
tion of new techniques through state trade secret law will only
lead to medical technology being secured under the dizzying
crazy quilt of state trade secret law, which will hinder health
care access through the legal and financial uncertainty of intro-
ducing medical breakthroughs from state to state.
Prior user rights, by contrast, serve the Nation's important
policy objectives as a narrowly tailored solution addressing the
aforementioned health care system concerns. Prior user rights
promote certainty and hedge risk in legal and financial activity.
Just as we have traditionally sought to protect the fruits of in-
vention, in the future we must be certain to guard the root of the
inventive process just as strenuously. Maintaining a strong,
comprehensive intellectual property system, including medical
patents, enhances the likelihood that future resources and inspi-
ration will be invested in the innovation process.
While the patent system is criticized for distorting economic
activity and undermining efficiency, this system can be im-
proved.3' Critics contend that the economic value of patents is
lessened and the pursuit of applications is decreased as the lag
time between filing and granting increases. 5 In a race to the
patent office, firms may misallocate resources by trying to de-
velop inventions too quickly, where the same result could be
achieved by a more efficient resource allocation, greater inde-
pendence, lower costs, and less intensive research efforts.' 3 Ul-
timately, consumers bear this surcharge as firms restructure
their output pricing due to the processing lag. Since intellectual
property requires protective devices to guarantee a certain rate
of advancement, not just merely progress, the cost and pricing
advantages of prior user rights are worth considering.
When inventors invest less in research and development, the
rate of invention in a society decreases. Slowed innovation puts
individuals requiring medical care and expecting breakthroughs
34Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1027 ("The patent system may divert too many
resources away from productive activities in which returns are limited by the forces
of competition .... ").
m Sanders, supra note 75, at 70. This, added to the growing costs and uncer-
tainty of patent litigation, rendering patent application less favorable. Id.
Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1027 (citing FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL




at risk. Prior user rights help guarantee inventive development
and maintain a societally optimal innovation rate; eviscerating
medical patents does not.
Prior user rights alter the cost-benefit balance of the current
patent system. ' The use and price of patented inventions, and
the related inventive risk, should be nearer the social optimum.
Moreover, prices should be lower in a system with prior user
rights because prior user rights interrupt patent exclusivity and
hence, the patentee must share the market with the prior user
right holders.
Finally, prior user rights offer an important economic ad-
vantage for the Nation's health care system: enhanced stability.
Prior user rights are a stabilizing force hedging against the dis-
ruptive economic activity that occurs when a patent unexpect-
edly issues on technology already in use. Prior user rights also
create more competitive markets in those areas involving pat-
ented medical inventions.
New medical technologies promise increased health, longev-
ity, and an improved quality of life. The unforeseeable horizons
and genius of modern medical research promise new treatments
for cancer, Alzheimer's disease, and other congenital develop-
mental disorders. The genius of these bright horizons must not
be darkened by foreclosing the historical promise of our patent
system.
CONCLUSION
The patent system is a broad legal instrument with policy
objectives rooted in the Constitution. Some consider it merely a
means to promote science and the arts. 8 Others view it as an
economic device, affecting the nature of investment, risk, and
commerce, simultaneously enriching both inventors and the
public. Recently, Congress considered how the patent system
should interact with the Nation's health care regime. While the
patent system is flawed, critics and scholars cannot find its sub-
stitute. 9 The political process, while also imperfect, is clearly
'7 Prior User, supra note 190, at 85 (statement of R. Carl Moy).
MANSFIELD, supra note 86, at 244. Patents further the constitutional goal,
"[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8.
w MANSFIELD, supra note 86, at 244 (stressing social costs arising from mo-
nopolies and questioning importance of patents as incentives in modern economy).
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the best forum to address the multiplicity of ethical, economic
and societal issues at stake in this important debate.
Supporters concede that over the past 150 years, medical
process patents have had a nominal effect on the delivery of
health care in this country.35 For example, the inventor of Sur-
rogate Embryo Transfer (SET)35 admits he has never attempted
to enforce the patent. The individuals behind the rapid progress
of science which improves the promise and value of health care
delivery undoubtedly deserve broad protective devices, including
effective rights and remedies.
In the larger debate on biomedical patents, groups have
raised legitimate warnings that the "rapid pace of this technol-
ogy is outstripping society's capacity for considered moral judg-
ment."352 The debate on medical patents has invoked fears of
"wild-eyed scientists and Frankenstein monsters."53 The gothic
classic Frankenstein illustrates the dangers of secretive machi-
nations involving the medical arts. The result is clearly disas-
trous. The moral, unfortunately, is not as obvious. The role of
secrecy and rewards within the medical profession raises fun-
damental questions about the nature of our intellectual property
policies.
In the modern film adaptation of Frankenstein," Captain
Walton eulogizes the Doctor by reading the following Bible pas-
sage:
And, yea, I gave my heart to wisdom, and to know madness and
folly, and I perceived that all is vanity ... and vexation of spirit.
For in much wisdom is much grief. And he who increaseth
knowledge, increaseth sorrow. For god shall bring every work
and every secret thing into judgment whether it be good or it be
evil. 35
5
Proponents of biomedical patents assert that the motivation
is not to play God, but rather to play doctor and uphold the rev-
30 Noonan, supra note 22, at 663. "In a few instances ... the availability of pat-
ent protection may have helped raise money to privately develop medical tech-
niques." Id.
. The research to develop SET was financed with $500,000 from private fund-
ing, which would not have been possible if the process was not patentable. Noonan,
supra note 22, at 657.
352 Transgenic Hearings, supra note 339, at 398.
3' Gwen Roberts, Opposition to Life Patents, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1995, at B12.
35 MARY SHELLEYS FRANKENSTEIN (Columbia TriStar 1994).
' Id.; see also Ecclesiastes 1:16-18.
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erence for human life.356 In the earthly realm, however, Congress
remains the forum where the merits of medical patents will be
judged. In doing so, all sides of this issue must be heard, not
merely the fears and interests of any particular group.
In the future, Congress should restore all medical process
patents rights and enact prior user rights. While this debate in-
evitably requires a review of the underpinnings of our intellec-
tual property system and the Nation's major policy objectives, it
is also an opportunity to improve the patent system for all users,
including physicians and patients. Prior user rights are a nar-
rowly tailored solution that temper frustration and pose eco-
nomic and research benefits of their own, ensuring a smoother
running patent system, lower prices, and new discoveries. The
legislative process must be true to the Framers' vision. For cer-
tainly, what Congress prevents medical science from knowing
will hurt the public.
s Edmund L. Andrews, Religious Leaders Prepare to Fight Patents on Genes,
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1995, at 35 (comments of Lisa Raines). Religious leaders re-
spond that an inherent tension underlies biomedical patents since the "[rieverence
for all life created by God may be eroded by subtle economic pressures." Transgenic
Hearings, supra note 339, at 398.
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